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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines the political economy of public-private partnerships (PPPs), 
specifically how power has been shared among the partners involved in the co-management of 
forestry lands in Northwest Saskatchewan.  It uncovers the political agendas of the groups 
involved, how decisions have been made and costs/benefits been shared, and considers the 
implications this model of co-management has for the future of forestry in this province.  
 This study reveals a complex partnership in which power is not being shared equally.  A 
private corporation, Mistik Management Ltd., possesses power over production, knowledge and 
credit.  It purports to be working together with stakeholders in the co-management of forestry 
lands in Northwest Saskatchewan, but in truth Mistik is managing this resource with minimal 
input from forest users and residents in the region.  The company does, however, appear sincere 
in its consultation process with stakeholders and is trying to improve the level of their 
engagement in day to day forestry operations.  In addition, and despite this deficiency in 
stakeholder engagement, Mistik is practicing what is arguably the most environmentally 
sustainable forestry management in the province. 
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Chapter One: 
Introduction and Background 
1.1 Introduction 
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are an example of an innovative alternative service 
delivery model, one that is increasing in popularity with both governmental policymakers and 
private sector institutions.  While there has been much written about PPPs, the literature tends to 
be descriptive, lacking a theoretical basis.  This thesis is an attempt to fill part of that gap. 
PPPs are becoming increasingly common as government chooses to devolve 
responsibility for program and service delivery to the private sector and civil society.  The 
reasons for the creation of PPPs are numerous but precisely how they operate and their results 
are not well documented.  What is of greater interest to this study is the inner dynamics of 
partnerships-- what each partner brings to the table, in terms of their values and goals for the 
partnership, how the partners share power and knowledge and how they all benefit from the 
arrangement.  It is also important to consider the external forces that act upon a partnership, as is 
the case with any service model-- it does not exist or operate in a vacuum.   
To analyze the internal and external dynamics of PPPs, theories such as political 
economy, collective action and social capital will be used. In addition, a specific case of a 
particular PPP model will be examined--- the co-management of forestry land in Northwest 
Saskatchewan.  This case adds some additional concepts to the PPP discussion, as it brings 
together not only the traditional partners of government and the private sector but also 
Aboriginal communities living on reserve land.  These communities have a unique culture, 
language and knowledge that impact this partnership and make this case a much-needed addition 
to the PPP body of literature. 
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Although the central focus of this thesis is the dynamics of partnerships, attention is also 
devoted to other important facets of this particular partnership such as the co-management of 
natural resources, sustainable forestry management and the implications of having an Aboriginal 
population with an entirely different knowledge base as one of the partners in a PPP model.  
As part of the obligation to consult with Aboriginal peoples, the forestry company Mistik 
Management in Northwest Saskatchewan has joined co-management boards in the communities 
of the Meadow Lake Tribal Council.  It has been trying to make these boards, its own Public 
Advisory Committee and the co-management process work for decades.  This thesis will provide 
some important insights on, among other things, the challenges associated with engaging  
Aboriginal communities to co-manage natural resources, and specifically how well Mistik 
Management has performed this task.  The following diagram illustrates how the partners fit and 
work together in this co-management arrangement: 
Figure 1.1 
 
Province of 
Saskatchewan 
FMLA 
NorSask Sawmill 
“Stakeholder Groups” 
- co-management boards 
- MLTC 
- SERM 
- environmental groups 
- “interested communities” 
- trappers, outfitters 
- etc. 
Mistik Management 
Meadow Lake 
(APP) Pulp Mill 
Meadow Lake 
Tribal Council 
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1.2 Co-management and Mistik Management 
The term co-management is used here to describe any formal or informal arrangement 
made between government, the private sector and/or civil society pertaining to the management 
of natural resources.  The prevalence of this type of management has increased over the past 20 
years; numerous examples of it can be found in developing nations where poverty and natural 
resource degradation have led state and society into co-management arrangements. It is also 
becoming more common in countries like Canada, where it is recognized that local landowners 
and Aboriginal populations have inherent interests and rights in the longevity and sustainable 
development of common pool resources, such as fisheries, forests, watersheds and pasture land. 
  The concept of co-management goes beyond a new or different form of resource 
management.  It is an inherently political process:  
…involving a restructuring of power and responsibilities among stakeholders. This 
restructuring involves moving away from a situation of top-down decisions and lack of 
coordination among Aboriginal and governmental resource management to 
decentralization and collaborative decision-making.1  
 
That being said, there is a wide variance in how power is being shared in co-management 
agreements, from a process wherein the public is informed of decisions made concerning 
resources, to an actual collaborative arrangement where responsibility and authority is shared 
equally among stakeholders.  This concept will be explored further in chapter three. 
Since the signing of the James Bay and Northern Quebec agreement in 1975, co-
management agreements in Canada have proliferated.  There are co-management arrangements 
and formal boards concerning caribou, beluga whales, timber, non-timber forest products and 
fisheries to name but a few. The co-management agreement of interest to this thesis is one 
                                                 
1 Gerett Rusnak. Co-Management of Natural Resources in Canada: A Review of Concepts and Case Studies. 
(Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 1997) Also available online at: 
 http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-82035-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html    
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between the Province of Saskatchewan, the forestry company Mistik Management and the 
communities of the Meadow Lake Tribal Council. 
The largest First Nations’ owned forestry company in Canada, NorSask Forest Products, 
is located in Meadow Lake, Saskatchewan. It is owned by the Meadow Lake Tribal Council. In 
1988, NorSask entered into a Forest Management License Agreement with the Government of 
Saskatchewan, entitling the company to harvest timber within a region of the province termed 
the NorSask FMLA. In 1990, NorSask and Millar Western Pulp created a joint venture company 
known as Mistik Management Ltd.  
The purpose of forming Mistik was to ensure an ongoing supply of softwood for the 
NorSask sawmill and hardwood for the pulp mill. Thus, NorSask and the pulp mill are Mistik’s 
two shareholders. Beyond the procurement of timber, Mistik has also been entrusted with the 
consultation of Aboriginal stakeholders in the region, a requirement of the original FMLA. To 
this end, Mistik joined co-management boards in MLTC communities, bringing them under the 
umbrella of a Public Advisory Group. This larger group consists of individual “stakeholder 
groups” (their term), such as environmental organizations, trappers, outfitters, forest workers and 
urban and rural municipality representatives.  
Mistik has made significant contributions to the economy of northern communities. In 
2004, the total full time employment provided by the forestry, saw and pulp mill operations 
amounted to 829 jobs.2 Today, Mistik, along with its partners in co-management, is responsible 
for over 1.8 million hectares of forestland. 
There are approximately 1,006,000 ha of potentially productive provincial forest types   
within the Mistik FMA area. Hardwood (primarily trembling aspen) forests are the dominant 
                                                 
2 Mistik Management Ltd. 20 Year Forestry Management Plan. (Meadow Lake: Mistik Management Ltd, 2007) 56. 
Also available online at: http://www.mistik.ca/fmp.htm  
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(32%) type, Jack pine-dominated forest stands are the next most extensive, followed by black 
spruce. Cumulatively, mixed wood forests comprise approximately 18% of the potentially 
productive forest land base of the FMA area.3 Mistik is responsible for a significant amount of 
timber in Saskatchewan. Harvest volumes were second only to Weyerhaeuser (when it was in 
operation); it is now a dominating force in the province’s forest industry. 
 
4 
                                                 
3 Ibid., 243.  
4 Global Forest Watch Canada. Linking Forests and People. Found online 1/12/07 at: 
http://www.globalforestwatch.ca/tenure/maps/Map15.png  
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This chart illustrates Mistik’s harvest volumes and areas in comparison with other license 
holders in the province.  It is important to note that very little logging is currently taking place in 
the Weyerhaeuser FMA due to the closure of the Prince Albert mill, and that its license could 
soon be ceded to the province.   
There are eleven Meadow Lake Tribal Council (MLTC) communities within the FMLA, 
nine of which currently have comanagement or advisory boards in place.  A list of all 23 
communities in the FMLA and their respective populations appears below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Government of Saskatchewan. First Report on Saskatchewan’s Provincial Forests, (Government of Saskatchewan, 
2006) 27.  
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 Within these communities, the percentage of Aboriginal people is as follows:  
   7 
                                                 
6 Mistik Management Ltd. 20 year Forestry Management Plan, (Meadow Lake: Mistik Management Ltd., 2007) 
109. 
7 Ibid., 110. 
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In the communities within the FMLA, there is a high, and rapidly growing, population of 
youth. There is a higher unemployment rate than the provincial average.  These factors taken 
together will see increasing demand for the employment opportunities found within Mistik.   
Mistik does work to ensure there are opportunities for Aboriginal people in the FMLA.  
Specifically, the company aims for 60% of contractor person days to be done by Aboriginal 
workers. It has consistently surpassed this goal since 2003. It also strives to offer work to local 
people, Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal alike.  Since 2003, the company has routinely surpassed 
its goal of 80%.8 
A number of factors make Mistik Management and the NorSask Forest Management 
License Area an interesting topic, worthy of continued research and discussion. A number of 
authors have written on the area; it has been the subject of more than one thesis and dissertation. 
What makes this story unique is that a private industry has pursued extensive consultation with 
Aboriginal communities and other relevant stakeholders. While an essence of consultation was 
agreed upon in the Forest Management License Agreement with the province, Mistik has gone 
beyond the fulfillment of this obligation. It meets regularly with the co-management boards, has 
provided funding to them and has set up a Public Advisory Group. Perhaps more importantly, it 
has actually incorporated input from these boards into forestry operations.  What remains to be 
seen is how much power is being shared with the community boards, and if this model of 
management is actually satisfying either party.  
Mistik Management is in a unique position in Northwest Saskatchewan. It has established 
and maintained a relatively successful co-management process with Aboriginal communities. It 
has engaged a number of stakeholder groups, including local users, and an environmental NGO. 
Mistik also appears to be earnestly working towards sustainable forestry practices and is about to 
                                                 
8 Mistik Management Performance Indicator Summary. Presented by Al Balisky August 2007. Meadow Lake, SK. 
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be certified by the Forest Stewardship Council9. In 1999, the Sierra Club rated this company as 
an example of “best practices” within the forestry industry.   
1.3 Co-management and Aboriginal Communities 
A common theme has emerged in the literature on co-management-- the importance of 
community involvement in co-management schemes. More than one work speaks to hurdles, 
such as mistrust, that Mistik had to overcome in the communities, and the lengths it has gone to 
in order to ensure meaningful participation. Authors on this subject have provided background 
on the issue, revealing why and how these partnerships were formed and what obstacles they 
faced. An important distinction to be made in co-management with Aboriginal communities is 
the recognition in the courts of their right to be consulted on matters regarding resource 
management. Their rights to resource use should take precedence over those of commercial 
interests, though historically, this has seldom been the case.10 
There are concerns with the manner of consultation taken on by companies such as 
Mistik, as to whether or not they are sincere or, in some cases, ethical. The fact that the 
community co-management boards are funded by Mistik creates some concern for the objectivity 
of the board and may affect the meaningful participation of community members. This is also a 
potential conflict of interest-- a concern echoed by the provincial government. Information such 
as this will aid the analysis of this case study, as the history of a partnership has the potential to 
affect its operations, whether it is 10 or 20 years down the line.  The report entitled “Co-
Management: Report of the Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs and Northern 
                                                 
9 Mistik announced January 8th, 2008 it has achieved FSC certification.  The auditing team, did however, express 
concern with the community co-management boards’ functionality as well as Mistik’s level of engagement with 
them  The is also some discussion amongst the Public Advisory Board that the certification is to be challenged by 
the Big Island Lake Cree Nation.  
10 Suzanne Mills, Maureen Reed. Renewable Resource Use in Northern Saskatchewan. In Saskatchewan: A 
Regional Geography. ed. M. Lewry (Regina: Canadian Plains Research Centre, 2004).   
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Development”11 identifies what is working well within other co-management arrangements. It 
presents the results of a study undertaken by the Government of Canada to assess co-
management practices in Saskatchewan and to offer up suggestions to the province for 
consideration.  
The report cites statements from key witnesses, from the province and members of 
indigenous communities involved in co-management. The concept of integrated resource 
management is discussed, wherein traditional ecological knowledge (TEK) is blended with 
outsider’s scientific knowledge, towards a more holistic framework in which indigenous users 
feel valued and involved.  Economic benefits of co-management are addressed -- when users are 
actively involved in a system, they are more likely to support a resulting development project. 
Together, the parties can work to ensure the development is ecologically sound and will 
contribute to the long-term health and success of the community.  
Co-management is not seen to conflict with treaty rights, while it will likely work to 
resolve conflict over resource use. It is important to involve all interested members of the 
community, both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal, in order to build true consensus and have 
decisions made by the board supported by all local people. Their participation should be aided by 
government, both in funding and in education. 
This report looks favourably on co-management schemes-- as opportunities to engage 
Aboriginal communities, to apply truly integrated resource management, all towards the long-
term health of communities and their surrounding ecosystems.  
There are, however, other partners involved in shaping Mistik’s forestry management in 
addition to the community co-management boards. There is one environmental group in 
                                                 
11 Raymond Bonin.  “Co-Management: Report of the Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs and Northern 
Development”. (Canada: Queen’s Printer. 1995). 
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particular that has had a significant involvement with the consultative process. It is not unheard 
of for an NGO to work beside industry or government. To better understand the relationship 
between groups such as the Saskatchewan Environmental Society and Mistik Management, it is 
important to review what has been written about the topic.  
1.4 Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Environmental Policy 
The politics of environmental NGOs have been explored with reference to their growing 
more corporate over time. This concern is of particular interest to this case study, as the 
Saskatchewan Environmental Society in particular has worked very closely with Mistik 
Management over the last couple of years. One author has proposed that the more groups attempt 
to engage and lobby with business and government, the more they have begun to resemble 
them.12 Many of the larger groups are losing their penchant for resistance or protest style politics 
and are instead becoming more focused on fundraising, reliant on “conventional tactics and more 
constrained by the imperatives of organization building and maintenance”.13  
This reveals an interesting relationship between the members of this partnership. 
Environmental groups tend to have to look in and comment from the outside, but in the case of 
Mistik, they were invited in. This puts the Saskatchewan Environmental Society into a unique 
position, wherein it is capable of influence, and arguably, of being influenced itself. 
ENGOs can also be construed as pressure groups, affecting policy created by the federal 
and provincial governments. There is a reported tendency of these groups to choose to stay 
outside the sphere of influence, for fear of co-optation, and to be in a better position from which 
                                                 
12 Jeremy Wilson. “Continuity and Change in the Canadian Environmental Movement: Assessing the Effects of 
Institutionalization”. In Canadian Environmental Policy: Context and Cases. eds. Debora VanNijnatten, Robert 
Boardman (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2002) 46-65. 
13 Ibid., 47. 
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to engage the public.14 The importance of having ENGOs work as pressure groups is explained 
well in the literature. As groups have been able to open up debates on environmental issues, they 
have pushed for greater accountability measures in terms of policy and government practices, 
and they have “enriched our democracy by articulating perspectives that have for too long went 
unexpressed”15.  
It is important to note that while many ENGOs stay true to their grassroots politics, a 
number of groups have worked successfully with industry to enact change. While the list of their 
achievements is long and quite impressive, they are still subject to criticism from academics and 
other environmental groups, who see them as being corporate entities themselves.   
It is important to consider the role of the Saskatchewan Environmental Society in light of 
this concern. While its motivations for involvement in the Public Advisory Group, its potential to 
act as watchdog and to enact change will be explored, so too will be the basis for this fear of co-
optation and institutionalization.  
1.5 Importance of this Inquiry 
Co-management of natural resources in Saskatchewan involves a variety of groups and 
individual actors. Hence, it is topic ideally suited for political studies and more specifically, 
studies related to political economy.  On a theoretical level, we can examine power relations, 
undertake a cost/benefit analysis and discuss the relationship between the state, the market and 
civil society.  As the case study involves Aboriginal community boards and a Public Advisory 
Committee we can also expand the dialogue to consider the role of public private partnerships 
and the impact of group dynamics and social capital on natural resource management.   
                                                 
14 Jeremy Wilson. Green Lobbies: Pressure Groups and Environmental Policy. In Canadian Environmental Policy: 
Ecosystems, Politics and Process. ed. Robert Boardman (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1992) 105-125. 
15 Ibid., 124.  
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Mistik Management is responsible for ensuring the terms of the FMLA are met, 
specifically to operate within a co-management framework with MLTC communities and engage 
in meaningful consultation with forest users and Northern residents.  It is essentially MLTC who 
is responsible to ensure the terms of the FMLA are met. As Mistik is partially owned by MLTC, 
this case could be viewed as unique in terms of Aboriginal governance.   
There has been a great deal written about private-public partnerships in the political 
science literature. To date, it has been mostly descriptive rather than theoretical. In employing 
the framework of political economy, I am hoping to add another lens through which to examine 
the subject.  
Partnerships are becoming increasingly prevalent in society as government continues to 
prioritize its service delivery under the rubric of efficiency, so this topic itself is highly relevant 
to the field. Over half of our land mass in Saskatchewan is boreal forest.  This forest contributes 
to tourism and recreation, it provides vital habitat for innumerable species, many endangered or 
threatened, and the forestry industry is a significant source of wealth for the province, 
contributing more than $750 million a year into the provincial economy.16 It is my hope that 
taken together, the topics of political economy, partnerships and forestry combine to produce a 
unique thesis that offers insight into each field. 
1.6 Focus, Objectives, Limits of the Study 
For the purpose of this thesis, it is important to know what has motivated the different 
sectors and key actors to become involved with the co-management arrangement, how power has 
been shared among them and the costs and benefits each has accrued. I am specifically interested 
                                                 
16   Government of Saskatchewan. Industry and Resources. Primary Forestry, (Regina: Government of 
Saskatchewan, 2007) Dowloaded 16/10/07: http://www.ir.gov.sk.ca/Default.aspx?DN=0611cefd-529d-4a9b-af4b-
0b8c1452e568  
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in whether or not Mistik has enhanced the capacity of the Aboriginal communities to have 
greater involvement in forest management.   
The focus of this study is the political economy of private-public partnerships, 
specifically the power relationships among the partners involved in the co-management of 
forestry lands in Northwest Saskatchewan. The objective of this thesis is to determine how 
power has been shared between the partners. It will seek to uncover the political agendas of the 
groups involved, how decisions have been made and costs/benefits been shared, and will 
consider the implications this model of co-management has for the future of forestry in this 
province.  
The term “partnerships” refers to those formal and informal arrangements made between 
state and non-state actors. For the purpose of this thesis, the partnerships of greatest interest are 
those between the private company Mistik Management and certain members of its Public 
Advisory Group. Within this group the focus is on the Government of Saskatchewan, the 
community co-management boards and the Saskatchewan Environmental Society. 
1.7 Research Questions 
This thesis addresses three questions: 
1. What are the motivations of the actors involved? What are the internal and external forces 
that have contributed to each party’s involvement in the co-management process? 
2. What type and degree of power does each partner wield in a partnership? What are the 
specific power relations in the Mistik case study? 
3. How is this partnership perceived by the partners? Is it a success or failure? 
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1.8 Thesis Outline 
The thesis is comprised of six chapters. Chapter two contains a brief discussion as to the 
methodology employed; chapter three offers an extensive literature review indicating what has 
been done well and what gaps remain to be studied. The fourth chapter frames the analysis, 
explaining the foundations of both political economy and public private partnerships. It applies 
the theoretical framework to the co-management scheme being practiced by Mistik Management 
(as documented in reports and agreements). Within it, internal and external forces that have 
caused each party to seek partnership status are examined. Also discussed are the partners’ 
motivations, the costs and benefits they have incurred because of co-management and how 
power has been shared among the players. Chapter five provides an overview of the findings of a 
short survey and some informal conversations conducted with stakeholders.  The final chapter 
provides a summary overview and analysis of the major findings of the thesis, as well some 
observations regarding the limits of the study and suggestions regarding areas for further 
research. 
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Chapter Two: 
Methodology 
2.1 Introduction 
 What follows is a brief chapter addressing a somewhat unique methodology that evolved 
throughout the writing of this thesis.  The main tasks of the study are explained and care is taken 
to address the nature and limitations of the investigation. 
2.2 Application of Theory 
 
 While this thesis has six topical chapters, it can essentially be broken down into two main 
parts. The first is an examination of theories that contribute to the study of public-private 
partnerships. The second is the discussion and analysis of a case study which tests the main 
theories presented by considering the perceptions of the partners in a co-management 
arrangement.  This analysis further tests whether or not the arrangement truly is “co-
management” or if it is in fact some other type of partnership.   
 Because data and information was collected throughout the writing of the thesis, it could 
be challenged that the theories were pre-selected to correlate to the case study, but this is not an 
accurate assumption. In truth, there remains much to be determined about this particular case, so 
much so that no theory can be officially proven or disproven to apply.  In that regard, while there 
were indications that some ideas were more applicable to the case study than others, there was no 
true hypothesis to test.  
 An important aspect of the case study should be acknowledged as it applies to theory.  
Public-private partnerships usually, or traditionally, involve the state in partnership with a private 
entity, or in some cases, the state in partnership with a civil body.  This case is somewhat 
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different in that it has a private body, Mistik Management, taking over the traditional role and 
territory of the state, in partnership with civil groups, the MLTC co-management boards and 
communities.  This requires a shift in the theoretical examination, from realist/liberal notions that 
would explain state-market partnerships to that of liberal/dependency theory that better explain a 
market-civic pairing.  This shift is what allows an expansion of thought, to consider the worth of 
Maslow’s triangle, Olson’s collective action and Putnam’s social capital. At first glance, these 
theories do not appear to fit in a thesis about PPPs and political economy. However, once one 
understands how this case differs and the very specific nuances a private-civil partnership 
possesses, the usefulness of these theories becomes exceedingly clear. 
2.3 The Literature Review 
 
In an attempt to understand the political economy of partnerships in forestry co-
management, an explanation is offered as to how political economy offers an appropriate 
framework for analysis of this case study. Relevant literature is then explored, including past 
interviews that have been conducted with the partners, to determine the costs and benefits for 
each of the parties involved in the partnership. “Literature” refers to everything from co-
management agreements, government legislation, reports and theses to books, journal and 
newspaper articles, and information from Mistik Management’s website.  It is important to note 
that the majority of information in this work is from secondary sources.  
2.4 Investigative Method 
 
I began collecting information on this case in 2005, when I became an employee of the 
Saskatchewan Environmental Society.  While being an employee within SES would appear to 
make me biased, in truth I was in a position to hear many sides of the story, from numerous 
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people with differing interests and concerns.  When it came time to start actively researching for 
my thesis, I concentrated on the information presented by the two sides of the public 
involvement debate, hence pursuing the idea of power and control in partnerships.   
I have been collecting information on the Mistik case study for more than two years, so 
most of the information contained in this work is from informal personal conversations 
conducted on an ad hoc basis.  I have spoken to an estimated 25-30 people about this case, 
ranging from those at forestry management meetings who answered specific questions to those 
who have lived and worked in the MLTC communities and were able to provide valuable insight 
into people’s perceptions of Mistik and their management of the FMA.  This line of inquiry, 
while not overly structured, was the most appropriate for the Aboriginal MLTC community 
members, as well as my co-workers and colleagues, and it lead to the questions that needed to be 
asked. This information, while it provided depth to the case and directed me to areas of concern, 
was not adequate to fully explain the functioning of the co-management arrangement, or how 
those directly involved in the process perceived the partnership.  To remedy this, in August of 
2007 I traveled to Buffalo Narrows to observe a co-management meeting and to interview board 
members. I visited with board members in Ile a la Crosse, and I observed a two day Public 
Advisory Group meeting in Meadow Lake.  I also administered a brief survey (see Appendix 2), 
which was completed, in person or by telephone, by 12 members17 of the “stakeholder group” 
including members of the Buffalo Narrows and Ile a la Crosse co-management board.   
This thesis was never intended to be quantitative. My goal was to try and unearth what 
theories might be relevant to PPPs and most of the information on the case study was gathered 
before I visited the MLTC communities in person.  It could be contended that I was biased upon 
                                                 
17 Only two of the respondents were female, five were Metis, two were non-Aboriginal and five were First Nations.  
The surveys were not analyzed on this basis, but this may be relevant to their responses. 
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entering Buffalo Narrows, Ile a la Crosse and Meadow Lake, as I had a good idea as to what I 
would find, but none of the information I gathered was excluded if it did not “fit” with my 
assumptions.  The survey results in particular, did confirm much of what was already known, but 
were of such variety18 that, taken alone, could not be seen to prove or disprove the applicability 
of any political theories. Nevertheless, the respondents filled some gaps and provided more 
specific information on Mistik’s failures and successes.   
 It is important to make note that all of the stakeholders, including Mistik’s staff, have 
been genuinely helpful and forthcoming over the last 2 years.  It seems everyone wants their 
story heard. 
2.5 Conclusion 
 This chapter explains why a specific methodology was chosen and what made it 
appropriate to the topic, as opposed to deficient.  It discusses the writer’s relation to the case 
study, the ways and means of information collection and the challenges associated with what 
might be considered a normative study. 
                                                 
18 The survey questions were all open-ended so as not to constrain the dialogue. Information gathered that was not 
pertinent to the question asked was used to inform other aspects of the case study.   
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 Chapter Three: 
 
Literature Review 
3.1 Introduction 
This thesis examines the political economy of private-public partnerships, specifically the 
power relationships among the actors involved in the co-management of forestry lands in 
Northwest Saskatchewan. This literature review begins with an explanation of political economy 
and public-private partnerships. It then focuses on co-management with Aboriginal communities 
and concludes with some thoughts on NGO involvement in environmental policy making.   
3.2 Political Economy 
Authors such as Gilpin and Cohn offer a succinct definition of political economy as the 
study of relations between politics and the economy and the relevant actors within them. Susan 
Strange (1994) defines the field of political economy as the analysis of social, political and 
economic arrangements that affect the practices of production, exchange and distribution (who 
wins/loses), as well as the values that serve as the foundation for the greater system. She 
proposes these arrangements are not pre-ordained, rather they are created by actor’s decisions 
“taken in the context of man-made institutions and sets of self rules and customs”.19  
This definition is made clearer by Strange in her discussion on values preferences in 
different societies. She states: “One obvious lesson is that different societies, in ordering their 
political economy, will give different values priority over others.”20 While some societies might 
                                                 
19 Susan Strange, States and Markets, 2nd edition. (London, New York: Continuum, 1994) 18.   
20 Ibid., 4.  
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place great importance upon security, another might instead chose to prize freedom, justice or 
wealth creation above all else. This definition is clearly useful in the study of partnerships, as the 
members tend to come from different sectors, each with its own values and priorities. Strange’s 
definition also reveals the ability of political economy to encompass theories outside of the 
discipline in order to better explain a phenomenon. In this case, political economy essentially 
becomes a lens through which we can examine the who, why and how of partnerships. It 
delineates characteristics of the state, private and voluntary sectors and it aids in the investigation 
of why such organizations of actors are formed and how they work. In addition, it also leads us 
to certain political implications, such as how partnerships are altering the shape of governance. 
Phillips (2007) work on the governance of innovation, wherein he incorporates 
sociological and behavioural thinking in addition to economic and political theories, offers an 
extension of the traditional IPE approach, which can help with the study of partnerships.  His 
work, drawing on Boulding, explicitly delimits the “pure” governing actors (the state, the market 
and civil authorities) as well as a myriad of hybrids. 
It is important to review these sectors’ respective roles in governance. The state is 
considered the traditional legitimate authority and has certain core characteristics: 
• the sustained ability to exercise overt and/or coercive power; 
• the ability to regulate the inputs and outputs of markets; and 
• the ability to define, shape and control a given society.21 
Government has at its disposal a number of tools, including command and control systems, 
incentives, disincentives and regulation. Regulation can be based on normative or positive 
                                                 
21 Peter Phillips. Governing Transformative Technological Innovation: Who’s in Charge?, (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar Publishing Inc., 2007).  
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grounds and is based upon legal traditions of civil code, common law, religious and customary 
law.22 
The market is based upon different assumptions than the state. It assumes that individuals 
left to their own devices will behave rationally in their transactions and will arrive spontaneously 
at a point of maximum utility. While this theory has its limits, it is true that authority has over 
time, shifted substantially from state to market forces. This shift can be chiefly attributed to state 
policies23, wherein governments are seeking to steer and not row. Market actors, or the private 
sector, have taken on duties and responsibilities formerly under the jurisdiction of states. This 
includes goods and service provision as well as certain aspects of governance. 
Civil society is composed of familial, religious and purpose-built structures. They are 
values driven, interest based and work towards enforcing norms.24  While this sector has often 
been classified as one in opposition to state and market, it is also one that works towards goals 
integral to society, such as unifying and mobilizing citizenry. While some civil groups may work 
in opposition, they have, much like the private sector, taken up new roles and responsibilities in 
order to bridge the gap in goods and service provision and governance.  
While many political economists arrange their analyses in this manner, state vs. market 
vs. civil society, a number of theorists have gone beyond the typology to examine how the 
characteristics of each group translate into action. This is evident in Picciotto’s (1995) adaptation 
of Boulding’s Triangle wherein he considers the types of goods and services to be offered in 
development programs and indicates which sectors are best able to deliver them.  
                                                 
22 Ibid.  
23 Susan Strange. The Retreat of the State: The diffusion of Power in the World Economy, (Cambridge: University 
Press, 1996). 
24 Peter Phillips. Governing Transformative Technological Innovation: Who’s in Charge?  (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar Publishing Inc., 2007). 
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       Hierarchy (State sector)  
       
  
 
 
 
    Market              Participation  
         (Private sector)              (Civil sector) 
 
 
 
 Nature of 
Public Goals 
Dominant 
Parameters 
Institutions Example 
A Government H State Agencies Justice, police 
 
B Toll M, H Public or regulated 
private corporations 
Public utilities 
C Public F, M Hybrid organizations Policy, rural roads 
 
D Market M Private corporations, 
farmers and entrepreneurs
Farming, industry, services 
E Civil F, M NGOs, PVOs Public advocacy, professional 
standards, civic activism 
F Common Pool F Local organizations, 
cooperatives 
Natural resource management 
Parameters: Hierarchy=H, Participation=P, Market=M25 
Gilles Paquet explains the foundations of this triangle: 
“(there is) the economic/market domain, where supply and demand forces and price 
mechanism are the norms; the state domain, where coercion and redistribution are the 
                                                 
25 Robert Picciotto. Putting Institutional Economics to Work: From Participation to Governance, World Bank 
Discussion Paper 304 (Washington: The World Bank Group, 1995) 11.  
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rules; and the civil society domain, where co-operation, reciprocity and solidarity are the 
integrating principles.”26  
 
  While there are certain goods and services that are best supplied by one sector, as in the 
government’s provision of public goods such as police protection, it is important to note that 
there is a significant amount of overlap, so that in many cases it is actually partnerships between 
the sectors that deliver specific goods.  
Picciotto makes an important point in his explanation of his triangle, that it is the nature 
of the goods and services to be delivered that determines the organizational design of what is 
essentially the governance model. According to his line of thinking, a common pool resource, 
such as forestland, would best be governed by local organizations or co-operatives. Taken alone, 
this scenario does not seem terribly realistic. Picciotto offers an explanation of how this might be 
achieved: 
The art of governance consists of achieving an appropriate balance between the products 
of various institutional goods so as to achieve a positive interplay between the state, the 
market, and the voluntary sector. There is a natural tension between each of these actors 
given their contrasting mandates and their different constituencies. An appropriate 
balance is struck when the full excessive power by any one sector is counteracted by one 
or the other two. Thus, if one sector is patently weak, judiciously selected capacity 
building projects can help redress the balance…Thus, effective governance involves 
cross-cutting and shifting alliances as well as deliberate capacity-building efforts aimed 
at mutually supportive operation of the state, the market, and the civil society.27 
 
  This theory has a number of implications not only for the case study, which will be 
discussed in chapter three, but to the study of public-private partnerships in general.   
Several authors have explored the reasons behind cooperation, whether it be “enforced” 
or in cases where game theory applies. They propose that stable cooperation is found in 
                                                 
26 Gilles Paquet. The New Governance, Subsidiarity, and the Strategic State. In Governance in the 21st Century 
(Paris: OECD, 2001) 183-214.  Found online at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/0/17394484.pdf.  
27 Robert Picciotto. Putting Institutional Economics to Work: From Participation to Governance, World Bank 
Discussion Paper 304 (Washington: The World Bank Group, 1995) 12.  
 
 24
situations where there is frequent contact between the interested parties, when the partnership is 
result-driven and when the parties perceive the relationship as long lasting. Though common 
goals are necessary, each sector enters into the partnership for different reasons, internal to their 
organization. The goal here is to identify what these reasons might be.  
There is a debate between those who view PPPs as “community governance”; necessary 
for effective and responsible policymaking, and those who are concerned with “incorporation”, 
wherein partnerships may result in the incorporation of independent actors into a corporate state. 
In order to form and maintain successful partnerships that retain the integrity of groups such as 
NGOs, there must be mutual trust and sharing of values among the partners. The central 
authority must be willing to cede power to the other sectors and should work towards building 
the capacity of the third sector towards meeting its goals (this concept will be explored in this 
thesis in the section that examines the potential motivations of the third sector). 
The creation of partnerships as “strategic alliances” is becoming increasingly common in 
North America. This growth has been influenced by issues such as fiscal constraint of 
government, the perception that bureaucracies are inefficient and the interest of the private sector 
in becoming more involved in service delivery. Initially, the majority of partnerships were 
between government and industry. They have now been expanded to include actors such as 
voluntary, non-profit and labour organizations. A number of writers agree there is a growing 
need to facilitate these coalitions, to increase consultation and participation and to address the 
wide range of issues, interests and regional differences that are being brought to the table. 
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Kernaghan classifies partnerships according to the degree of power sharing between the 
partners. The levels are termed collaborative, operational, contributory and consultative28, from 
the greatest degree of power sharing to the least. The case of co-management in Northwest 
Saskatchewan would be considered within this line of thinking as a “consultative” partnering, 
wherein the community boards (and the ENGO) do not have official decision-making authority, 
but their input is solicited by Mistik and integrated into management strategies. 
The International Association for Public Participation (IAPP) has developed a more 
comprehensive model to both measure and illustrate the different levels of engagement.  This 
document is highly relevant to co-management studies, as it provides another yardstick to 
measure the level of participation of parties involved.  A true co-management model would fit 
into the “collaboration” category, but many often fit into the first three categories.  Any 
partnership can be deemed “co-management”; it does not have to meet any prescribed 
conditions.  A successful model will have a high degree of public participation, but this is a more 
time consuming and energy intensive process, requiring a high degree of commitment from the 
parties involved.  It is also important to consider the qualities and capacities of the partners when 
assessing the level of participation, as well as their respective motivations coming into the 
partnership.  For instance, a corporate partner that has a requirement of consulting the public is 
more likely to choose a quicker or more “efficient” route to public involvement, one seen in 
“consulting”.  A public or not for profit body that has the goals of enhancing the capacity of a 
certain population is more likely to undertake a process such as “empowerment”.    
                                                 
28 Kenneth Kernaghan. “Partnership and Public Administration: Conceptual and Practical Considerations”. In 
Canadian Public Administration. Vol 36 No 1 1993. (Toronto, Ontario: Institute of Public Administration of 
Canada, 1993) 57-76. 
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This line of thinking harkens back to Boulding’s triangle.  We may actually be able to 
predict the level of public participation a given entity will engage in when we know where it fits 
in the triangle.  There are additional theories from the behavioural sector that will provide insight 
into how these partnerships might work.   
3.3 Why Groups Form and How they Work 
There are at least three different approaches to explain why groups form. Sociology 
proposes that groups form to pursue shared values or interests. Political scientists see groups 
forming to replace what has been lost in the weakening of kinship ties. They also consider the 
                                                 
29 International Association for Public Participation. IAP2 Public Participation Spectrum. (International Association 
for Public Participation, 2007) Found online 3/6/07 at: http://www.iap2.org/associations/4748/files/Spectrum.pdf  
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possibility that humans have an inherent desire to herd. Economists suggest individuals form 
groups out of their own self-interest. Mancur Olson supports this latter belief and examines it 
thoroughly in his work on collective action. He expands upon the notion of ‘why’, going furthe
to explain how groups do and do not work.  
According to Olson, “any group, larg
r 
e or small, works for some collective benefit that by 
its very
e than 
ome groups will form somewhat organically, out of recognition of shared interests, 
while o
 
all 
the group in question therefore have a common interest in 
obtaining this collective benefit, they have no common interest in paying the cost of 
d 
t.31 
  
  
                                                
 nature will benefit all the members of the group in question”.30 He notes there are 
different types of groups and that certain arrangements and organizations are more effectiv
others.  
S
thers are mandated by a central authority. Once the group has formed and begins to 
function, it then becomes apparent that not all actors within the group behave in an identical
fashion. While this point might seem obvious, Olson investigates the theory behind it. He is 
chiefly concerned with the amount of time and energy different actors contribute, while they 
receive the same gains. He states:  
Though all the members of 
providing that collective good. Each would prefer that the others pay the entire cost, an
ordinarily would get any benefit provided whether he had borne part of the cost or no
 
While he does not employ the term, this situation is referred to in the literature as “free-
riding”, a common problem whenever collective goods are the desired end. Olson feels this is 
more of an issue in larger groups, when individual’s actions are not readily observable by the 
other members. For this, and other reasons he suggests that small groups are more efficacious.
 
30 Mancur Olson. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1965) 21.  
31 Ibid., 21.  
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Olson’s work suggests that the collective good will be provided by the group in its 
totality only when the benefit to the individual exceeds his/her cost of participating in the group. 
In this situation, the group provides its own positive reinforcement to its members, which 
virtually guarantees its longevity and success. In the case of co-management, the cost borne by 
stakeholders involved in management could be calculated and compared to the measured 
benefits. One could assume that the stewardship and sustainability of the resource would be a 
collective good of great merit, but that may not be enough to compensate people for their 
individual contribution.  
Financial incentives may be all that is required to have stakeholders remain involved in a 
co-management group. Olson proposes that in any cases where incentives are required they will 
have to be either financial or social. This is the case in many organizations or political structures 
in smaller communities wherein the contribution by an individual is recognized by others.  
Olson provides a number of indications as to how groups can be successful in achieving 
common goals. There are, however, additional predictors of group/partnership success pertaining 
to co-management. 
3.4 Predictors of Success for Co-management 
Through the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), Tyler (2007) has compiled 
a list of “lessons learned” over the last 20 years of international co-management research.  He 
suggests that first and foremost, people must be put at the centre of any initiative, that 
outsiders—be it government officials, researchers or private sector representatives-- engage in 
meaningful consultation with all the members of the community.  Knowledge should be shared 
among partners and built upon. New institutions for management should be created towards 
establishing processes of local governance.  Indigenous people’s rights to common pool 
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resources must be recognized and their access secured.  To ensure success, innovation should be 
a common objective—finding solutions that deliver early returns as well as long term gains that 
are interdisciplinary and supported by policy.32 
The IDRC also acknowledges a number of challenges inherent in co-management models. 
The one challenge that bears mentioning relates to the difficulty engaging local people: 
Participatory methods require skilled management, keen observation, tact, and patience. 
It is always easier to engage powerful, outspoken resource users than to work with the 
poorest and most isolated, who also tend to be the most reserved. These participants-on-
the-sidelines, often women and members of minority ethnic groups, may be so busy with 
family survival that they have little time for interacting with external facilitators.33 
 
Without simplifying the issue too much, the argument could be made that the success of a 
partnership essentially depends upon two things: the characteristics of the group that is formed 
and the characteristics of the members involved. With respect to the latter point, it is not 
necessary to delve into personal attributes or capabilities of any of the partners or group 
members; it is rather more important to consider the characteristics of communities in general. 
To this end, the concepts of a “hierarchy of needs” and “social capital” offer some useful 
insights. 
Abraham Maslow’s hierarchy of needs has been used widely, adapted and expanded upon 
for over fifty years. His ideas are often used in discussions on politics, and in this example, on 
governance: 
Without the underpinnings of literacy, physical health and a minimum sense of security, 
learning is seriously impeded. Without learning there can be little expectation of 
improvements in the quality of decision making at home, on the job or in the community 
at large.34   
 
                                                 
32 Stephen Tyler. Comanagement of Natural Resources: Local Learning for Poverty Reduction. (Ottawa, Ontario: 
International Development Research Centre, 2006) 73.  
33 Ibid., 76.   
34Abraham Maslow. “A Theory of Human Motivation”. In Psychological Review, Vol 50, 1943  (Washington, DC: 
American Psychological Association, 1943) 370-396.  
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Literacy, health and security are referred to in his writings as “human needs”. Maslow 
went on from a general description of needs to arrange them in hierarchies of “pre-potency”. In 
effect, one must first have the most basic needs satisfied before they can strive to meet any ego-
fulfilling needs. This concept is best illustrated by the pyramid that is now so often used in 
educational psychology, healthcare and business sectors.  
 
35 
While this model has been criticized over the years and is viewed by some as being trite, 
or at best widely overused, it does bring some important points to light for the potential success 
of groups and the Mistik case study in particular. Since we are considering the efficacy of a 
partnership composed of members of northern Aboriginal communities, it is essential that we 
understand that the most basic needs of many community members are not being met, or are at 
the very least under threat . It makes sense that those people who are struggling to stay warm in 
                                                
36
 
35 University of Tasmania. Community Leadership in Rural Health. Found online November 10, 2006. 
http://www.ruralhealth.utas.edu.au/comm-lead/leadership/Maslow-Diagram.htm  
36 I have personally lived on reserve in northern Saskatchewan and have witnessed the third world conditions many 
of our Aboriginal residents live in. 
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their homes or to put food on the table are not going to be the first in line to sit on a community 
advisory board. If one considers who is active on tribal councils in the communities, it tends to 
be the more privileged individuals that are able to, or interested in, getting involved.  
Regardless of whether or not it proves to be accurate in this case, Maslow’s hierarchy is a 
good reminder to consider where individuals are coming from, both physically and emotionally, 
when you examine their behaviour in a group. It also points to potential difficulties of working 
with disadvantaged communities.  
Like Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, social capital is not a new term. Jane Jacobs was using 
it to describe urban cohesiveness and the importance of maintaining neighbourhoods in the early 
1960s. Robert Putnam is one of the more prolific writers on the theory and has used it to examine 
“civic virtue” in both Italian and American contexts. Social capital can be defined as: “the stock 
of active connections among people: the trust, mutual understanding, and shared values and 
behaviors that bind the members of human networks and communities and make cooperative 
action possible.”37 In his foray into Italy, Putnam examined the differences between regional 
governments in the southern and northern parts of the country. He established a set of criteria to 
define a “successful institution” and then set about investigating why more institutions in the 
north succeeded while their counterparts in the south failed. What he discovered was that, due to 
differences in their histories, the north and south were almost opposite in their wealth of “civic 
community” or social capital. This led to the generalization that active, vibrant civic 
communities are integral to the functioning of democratic governance. 
In a more recent work, Putnam qualifies why social capital is important. It allows citizens 
to resolve collective problems more easily, it greases the wheels that allow communities to 
                                                 
37 Don Cohen, Larry Prusak. In Good Company. How Social Capital Makes Organizations Work. (Boston, MA: 
Harvard Business School Press, 2001) 4.  
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advance smoothly, it widens our awareness of the many ways in which our fates are linked and 
people who have active and trusting connections to others develop or maintain character traits 
that are good for the rest of society.38 
If we subscribe to this theory, then a partnership based in, or involving, a community rich 
in social capital would thus have a better chance of being successful. While there is a growing 
body of literature on using social capital analysis in Aboriginal communities, there does not 
appear to be a working consensus on whether or not it is appropriate or even all that useful.39 At 
first glance, however, it would appear that many communities are highly bonded. They tend to be 
of the same ethnic background and they share a common culture, language and history. Living 
on reserve, I have observed how active many people are in community events, religious and 
traditional activities. At the same time, their communities are also plagued by crime, addiction 
and abuse, symptoms of low social capital. This theory may serve to explain why some 
communities or institutions thrive while others do not, but it does not fully capture the essence of 
whether or not Aboriginal communities are going to be successful in partnerships. 
Literature from the public-private partnership domain offers some additional predictors of 
success that have been gathered in this case by evaluating a number of “good” and “bad” 
partnerships. Successful PPPs tend to have a shared clarity of purpose, mutual trust and respect 
among the partners, adequate investment of time and resources, clear roles and responsibilities 
and a shared goal of long-term sustainability.40  
                                                 
38 Robert Putnam. (2000) Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 2000) 288-290. 
39 Boyd Hunter, Taming the Social Capital Hydra? Indigenous Poverty, Social Capital and Measurement. (Centre 
for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, Australian National University, 2005). Downloaded 20/02/07. 
http://www.anu.edu.au/caepr/Publications/topical/Hunter_social%20capital.pdf  
40 Stephen Osborne, “Part Four- Evaluation” In Public-private Partnerships: Theory and Practice in International 
Perspective. (London: Routledge, 2000).   
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Four additional criteria have also been extracted by examining case studies on co-
management arrangements. First, the management system must be firmly linked to the 
community and have strong support from the individual members. Second, indigenous users 
must be allowed actual decision-making responsibilities in management. Third, the state must be 
willing to fund the co-management boards adequately, recognizing the opportunity costs borne 
by participants. Finally, cultural and linguistic barriers to Indigenous participation on boards 
must be reconciled to ensure open and honest communication and the necessary depth and 
breadth of community representation.41  
While Maslow’s hierarchy of needs and the theory of social capital lead us to ask 
pertinent questions, we also must incorporate some of the more practical information that has 
been collected in order to ensure a solid theoretical foundation to the study of partnerships.  
3.5 Power Relations in Partnerships 
Co-management of natural resources is inherently political, both in its operating 
structures and processes. As such, it is a management system rife with power exchanges. Thia 
thesis examines the types of power the major players wield and how that power is, and is not, 
shared. Special attention is given to the relationship between knowledge and power, specifically 
to scientific versus traditional ecological knowledge.  
A number of writers have explored the roots and meanings of power as a political 
concept. Bertrand Russell considered means of influence in organizational dynamics, 
categorizing them into the power of force and coercion, the power of inducements and the power 
                                                 
41 Gail Osherenko, Sharing Power with Native Users: Co-Management Regimes for Native Wildlife. (Ottawa: 
Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, 1988). 
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of propaganda and/or habit.42  His line of thinking could apply to the Mistik experience, as the 
company has significant power for inducing and rewarding participation of Aboriginal 
communities. Hannah Arendt considers power to be a political force. She thought it was ever-
present in interactions between people, and disappeared completely once they parted. As such, 
Arendt suggests the individual could neither hold nor exercise power alone; essentially being 
alone made one impotent.  
Michel Foucault also regarded power as a complex dynamic of interpersonal forces. 
According to Foucault, power is not necessarily about institutions and structures; it is more about 
relationships and particular situations in society. He analyzes power relations apparent in 
different discourses, such as western science, and arrangements within the penal system and in 
the hospital/clinic. In the penal system, Foucault examined complex interactions and behaviors to 
reveal simple patterns of power exchanges. He contends that power was not exerted over-- that it 
was not something one was subject to-- it was, rather, more about perception than anything else. 
Perhaps the most poignant observation he made along this vein concerned the panopticon, a 
creation of Jeremy Bentham’s. This machine enabled the prisoner to be viewed at all times, and 
from all angles. The prisoner knew the panopticon was in place, and that he could be seen.  
Foucault argues the prisoner’s knowledge of this was integral to the success of the machine; that 
the realization that he could be watched at any time was more important than whether or not he 
ever was.  
This concept of perception is applicable to the Mistik study. As mentioned earlier, the 
provincial government has formally ceded power to the forestry company, but it is only because 
the Aboriginal communities see Mistik as an authority within the system that the comanagement 
                                                 
42 Bertrand Russell. Power: A New Social Analysis. (New York: Routledge, 1938). 
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boards have functioned to the degree that they have. This may seem like an abstract or merely 
theoretical comment, but it also has weight in practice. Because Mistik is seen as a credible 
partner, there have not been any significant blockades since Canoe Narrows in 1992. For the 
most part, people have gone along with the co-management process, regardless of whether or not 
they believe in the outcome. It seems they believe in the system, or at least recognize the worth 
of their partnership within it.  
Susan Strange has also written extensively about power from a political economy 
perspective. She was less a philosopher than Foucault or Arendt and as such, was more 
concerned with the roots of power and the resulting implications on political structures and 
institutions.  Strange suggests it is not enough to ask who has the power in any given situation; 
we need to dig deeper to discover its source. It can be command or coercive force or it can stem 
from wealth or ideas. She classifies power as being either structural or relational. Relational 
power is the ability of “A” to get “B” to do something it would not normally do, something that 
in turn might benefit A. Those who possess relational power have the ability to make rules and 
the authority to ensure the rules are followed. This power can be afforded both through formal 
and informal agreements. One example of relational power is the New York Stock Exchange as 
it is a trading mechanism able to divest power from government. It functions within the financial 
superstructures created by government, but is able to dictate the rules of trading.  
While some examples of relational power are straightforward, such as the power of one 
state over another due to military superiority, there is also an essence of perception involved. For 
instance, Mistik has relational power within the comanagement structure because it has 
determined the rules by which the participants play. While this power has been granted to Mistik 
by the provincial government, it also requires the buy-in of the Aboriginal participants. If Mistik 
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was not perceived as an authority within the comanagement structure, the governing arrangement 
would not be functional.  
Strange asserts that structural power is the power to shape and determine structures 
because it:  
Confers the power to decide how things shall be done, the power to shape frameworks 
within which states relate to each other, relate to people, or relate to corporate 
enterprises. The relative power of each party in a relationship is more, or less, if one 
party is also determining the surrounding structure of the relationship.43  
 
Strange regards structural power as being comprised of four related components or 
individual sources. She places them on along the sides of a triangular pyramid to illustrate this 
point. The sources are control over security, control over finances, control over production, and 
control over knowledge, beliefs and ideas.  
Security is used here as the ability to protect a selected people from violence. Control 
over finances is seen in the ability to provide credit, control over production is the ability to 
provide necessary goods and services and control over knowledge is the power to grant or deny 
access to information. 
 
                                                 
43 Susan Strange, States and Markets, 2nd edition. (London, New York: Continuum, 1994) 25.  
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While control over security is of paramount importance to the study of international 
relations, it is not applicable to the case study. Mistik Management offers no protection to the 
individuals in the communities so this section of Strange’s structural power will not be explored 
here. The absence of this one side of the pyramid should not detract from the usefulness of the 
model as the company obviously holds and exerts the other three types of power. 
Credit is one area of control traditionally reserved for lending or state-run institutions.  
Strange has written extensively about the power held and exercised by organizations such as the 
World Bank and the IMF, specifically in developing countries.  She explains the relationship 
between credit and power as follows: 
The power to create credit implies the power to allow or to deny other people the 
ercise 
                                                
possibility of spending today and paying back tomorrow, the power to let them ex
purchasing power and thus influence markets for production.45 
 
 
44 Strange, 27.  
45 Strange, 90. 
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While the power relations between these monolithic actors and third world states have 
been well documented and are fairly clear, there are other credit relationships that bear further 
examination.  For instance, how does the balance of power change or shift in micro-credit 
associations? What if one of the partners is a for-profit corporation, such as in the Mistik case? 
Does the nature of the most powerful partner make any difference to the functioning of the 
partnership? This will be discussed further in the following chapter. 
The power of any actor or institution that creates wealth in society is increasing, perhaps 
exponentially, over time.  Strange explains how power is exerted through production: 
A production structure can be defined as the sum of all the arrangements determining 
what is produced, by whom and for whom, by what method and on what terms. It is 
people at work, and the wealth they produce by working. They may be helped by 
animals, or by machines. Their efforts may be supplemented by a bountiful Nature. But it 
is about how people at work are organized and what they are producing. The production 
structure is what creates the wealth in a political economy. 46 
 
Never before have corporate entities known such control over not only their own fate, but 
the fate of the market, public and civil society as well.  This balance of power is perhaps the 
most dynamic, as it is subject to a growing resistance from the other sectors.  Examples of this 
resistance from civil society are plentiful, especially in the developing world.  They are seen in 
the formation of cooperatives aimed at usurping globalized trade and the New York Stock 
exchange, demonstrations that succeed in ending privatization of common pool goods and even 
the formation of unions in branded sweat shops. This is a subject that has been written about by 
many authors and is a source of constant debate.   
Strange comes at the knowledge/power relationship from a structural angle. She suggests 
power is more about one party controlling another, by denying or granting access to knowledge.   
                                                 
46.Ibid., 64.  
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While the power derived from the other basic structures lies in the positive capacity to 
provide security, to organize production, to provide credit, the power in the knowledge 
structure often lies as much in the negative capacity to deny knowledge, to exclude 
others, rather than in the power to convey knowledge.47  
 
She subscribes to the commonly held belief that knowledge is power and that those who 
hold this power are highly regarded by others; she furthermore suggests that it is the exercising 
of this power and the control over communications and access that affords a distinct type of 
structural power.48 
Phillips further explores this notion of “control over” by asking the question “how do we 
know what we know?” Phillips plots the complex course of the governance of knowledge 
creation, specifically relating to western science, and the resulting access and benefit sharing.  
He also considers the actors and institutions in control of knowledge, asserting the university is 
“the cornerstone of the knowledge economy”.49 The university is the home of cutting edge 
researchers creating knowledge; it is an institution also capable of storing and communicating 
whatever it is that is created. Phillips explores the internal and external control over this 
knowledge. The external forces are perhaps the most interesting in relation to his topic of 
innovation, as well as to this topic of knowledge, especially in the area of financial support. As 
outside funders are becoming more the norm, there is increasing concern that they are able to 
shape the type of knowledge generated at the university. There is little funding for studies of, for 
example, the classics, while an area such as biotechnology has numerous financial supporters to 
draw upon. Non-governmental organizations are also the purveyors of knowledge and are 
susceptible to the same kind of financial influence. They are often seen to shift their 
                                                 
47 Strange, 119.  
48 Strange, 30.  
49 Peter Phillips. Governing Transformative Technological Innovation: Who’s in Charge? (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar Publishing Inc., 2007) 14.  
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organization’s entire mandate in order to be eligible for major pools of funding, from both the 
government and private sector. Both of these areas support Strange’s pyramid of controls; in fact, 
financial power and power over knowledge may actually have a greater correlation than she at 
first envisioned.  
While control over production and finances are both important concepts in the Mistik 
case study, the relationship between power and knowledge is of paramount concern.  Knowledge 
is power.  Sir Francis Bacon, who pioneered the modern scientific method, is credited with 
making this statement. Since his time, writers across the disciplines, including Michel Foucault 
and Susan Strange, have analyzed, expanded upon or adapted this concept to give it greater 
meaning and applicability to modern problems.  Strange comes at the knowledge/power 
relationship from a structural angle. She suggests: 
Knowledge is power and whoever is able to develop or acquire and to deny the access of 
others to a kind of knowledge respected and sought by others; and whoever can control 
the channels by which it is communicated to those given access to it, will exercise a very 
special kind of structural power.50  
 
While Foucault sees the power emanating from knowledge as more than the ability to 
restrict or deny access, he also considers the productive aspect. People would not be willing to go 
along with a system of governance that always said no, this would cause resistance or revolt. 
Rather, in Foucault’s opinion, the ability to produce or create to benefit people is imperative to 
keeping the system functioning. This is essentially the carrot and stick approach, one that works 
best if kept in some sort of balance. With regards to knowledge, the university would not be “the 
cornerstone of the knowledge economy” if the results of its research were never made available 
or benefited the public. It is this institution’s ability to produce that puts it at the forefront of the 
knowledge industry and affords it power in society.  
                                                 
50 Strange, 30. 
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From this perspective, the converse is also true: power is knowledge. Those individuals 
and organizations that wield power have the ability to decide what knowledge is produced and 
how it is to be shared. Foucault covered this topic at length, in numerous writings, regarding the 
creation of “truth”. He saw power being exercised by those who were somehow able to turn 
knowledge into truth. According to Foucault: 
Each society has its regime of truth, its “general politics” of truth-- that is the types of 
discourse it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances that enable 
one to distinguish true and false statements; the means by which each is sanctioned; the 
techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those 
who are charged with saying what counts as true.51 
  
In co-management studies, there is a general conception that two main types of 
knowledge come into play-- western or scientific and Indigenous knowledge. Using Foucault’s 
line of thinking on truth, one can easily see that the two types of knowledge from both societies 
have their politics of truth. In our western society, truth is usually a fact that can be proven or 
disproven through research or study. Hence, funders, governments, scientists and academics hold 
the power in the knowledge sector. In Indigenous societies, truth is what has been observed and 
passed down from generation to generation through oral histories. Elders and those with whom 
they choose to share their truths hold power in their society.  
Foucault notes that the interplay between the two is often characterized by the dominance 
of scientific knowledge over that held by lower class members of society. He suggests there are 
implicit sets of rules created by the scientific and university communities that work to discount 
knowledge held by outsiders. These rules determine what sorts of language and concepts are 
acceptable to the greater “knowledge” community and who will be considered credible. To 
                                                 
51 Michel Foucault, Power. (New York: New Press, 1994) 131. 
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understand exactly how these power systems work, it is first important to discuss the two types 
of knowledge—western and traditional ecological knowledge and to plot their basic evolution.   
3.6 Knowledge Systems 
Western knowledge systems dominate. Since the time of enlightenment, scholars have 
sought to distance themselves from nature through the use of science. At the dawn of 
enlightenment, it was widely thought that nature was dangerous and too far into the realm of the 
unknown. Europeans sought to increase their mastery, and hence power, over the unknown by 
breaking it down into observable, measurable parts. It was a period of tremendous growth in 
science and technical writing, the accumulation and communication of knowledge that together 
was considered to emancipate man from the subjection of the natural world.  
Forerunners of the enlightenment, such as Bacon and Descartes, were instrumental in 
creating the analytic method, breaking down complex problems into logical steps of deduction. 
This reasoning has lead through time to the compartmentalization of knowledge, a way of 
knowing that is reductionist and fragmented.52 Within the scientific method, variables are 
identified and controlled for. The result is a sustained or disproven hypothesis, what is essentially 
regarded as a “truth”. It is a truth because it is something reproducible under the same 
circumstances time and again; one step leads obviously to the next, to a quantifiable conclusion.  
While there are a number of branches of science, as Phillips illustrates, Kuhn’s “normal” 
science is perhaps the most appropriate to a more general discussion of knowledge. Practitioners 
of normal science utilize specific language and typologies to describe their observations. While 
this is highly useful to communication between practitioners, it could also be conceived as a 
                                                 
52  Timothy Hayward, “Ecology and Enlightenment” in Ecological Thought: An Introduction. (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1994) 8-52.  
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barrier to access by non-practitioners. The medical community perhaps best represents this in the 
jargon used to describe and communicate disease processes, types of diagnostics, etc. It is not 
uncommon for medical doctors to use jargon in communication with patients, leaving them often 
so confused they do not even know what questions they should be asking. Foucault saw this 
power relationship in the Birth of the Clinic, though he did tend to focus on control over the 
body, and not control over knowledge. 
This type of knowledge is referred to by a select group of writers53 as “mode 1” 
knowledge. It is the type of information produced by the scientific or academic community, one 
separate and distinct from the greater society. What this rendering of science does not consider is 
that no knowledge, or truth, is produced in a vacuum. Sheila Jasanoff points out that science is 
very much embedded within the larger society. The process of knowledge creation is open to 
influence at every stage, and as Jasanoff describes, it is entangled with social norms and 
hierarchies.54 Another conception of knowledge, known as “mode 2”, reconciles this false 
distinctiveness. It is important to understand the difference between the two modes: 
In Mode 1 problems are set and solved in a context governed by the, largely academic, 
interests of a specific community. By contrast, Mode 2 knowledge is carried out in a 
context of application. Mode 1 is disciplinary while Mode 2 is transdisciplinary. Mode 1 
is characterized by homogeneity, Mode 2 by heterogeneity. Organisationally, Mode 1 is 
hierarchical and tends to preserve its form, while Mode 2 is more heterarchical and 
transient. Each employs a different type of quality and control. In comparison with Mode 
1, Mode 2 is more socially accountable and reflexive. It includes a wider, more 
temporary and heterogeneous set of practitioners, collaborating on a problem defined in a 
specific and localized context.55 
  
                                                 
53 Michael Gibbons, Camille Limoges, Helga Nowotny, Simon Schwartzman Peter Scott and Martin Trow The 
NewProduction of Knowledge: The Dynamics of Science andRresearch inCcontemporary Societies. (London: Sage, 
1994). 
54 Sheila Jasanoff, (ed). States of Knowledge: The Co-production of Science and Social Order. (London: Routledge, 
2004). 
55 Gibbons et al., 3. 
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So, while good science was once conceived of as international, impersonal and virtually 
anonymous,56 it now appears to be shifting into a mode more fitting with a co-management 
model. If scientists and resource managers are amenable to the Mode 2 type of knowledge, there 
may be greater hope for compiling a more holistic picture of natural resources and building 
consensus with Aboriginal communities. While Mistik has access to extensive sampling, maps 
and the latest scientific data on forest management, the company will theoretically benefit from 
incorporating traditional knowledge from the local communities. It remains to be seen in this 
particular case if this has been done, or if there are any plans to do so.  
There is a re-emerging type of knowledge called traditional ecological knowledge (TEK). 
According to LaDuke “TEK is the culturally and spiritually based way in which Indigenous 
people relate to their ecosystems. This knowledge is founded on spiritual-cultural instructions 
from time immemorial and on generations of careful observation within an ecosystem.”57  
There are a number of sources for TEK acquisition. It can be passed down from 
generation to generation through a written or oral history, it can be gained by direct observation 
by those already knowledgeable and close to the land and it can be revealed to chosen people in 
spiritual visions.58 It is based upon values such as “respect, coexistence, cooperation, honor, 
thanksgiving, reciprocity, balance and harmony, and recognition of interrelationships among all 
of Creation.” 59 
                                                 
56  Robert Merton. The Normative Structure of Science. in Storer, N.W. (1973) The Sociology of Science. (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1942) 272. 
57  Winona LaDuke. (1994). “Traditional Ecological Knowledge and Environmental Futures,” in Colorado Journal 
of International Environmental Law and Politics. Endangered Peoples: Indigenous Rights and the Environment 
(Boulder: University Press of Colorado, 1994) 127. 
58  Marlene Castellano. “Updating Aboriginal Traditions of Knowledge,” in Indigenous Knowledges in Global 
Contexts. eds. George Dei, Budd Hall, and Dorothy Goldin Rosenberg (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000). 
59  Deborah McGregor. “Coming Full Circle: Indigenous Knowledge, Environment, and Our Future” In American 
Indian Quarterly. Vol 28 No 3,4. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004) 385. 
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It is easy to see from this description how TEK differs from Western, scientific 
knowledge, and how difficult it can be to reconcile the two. Some authors suggest that this is an 
impossible task, or at least one that has historically been done very poorly. There is a concern 
amongst scholars and Aboriginal communities alike that traditional knowledge is not being 
accessed or used properly, because it does not fit into the dominant paradigm. While forestry 
managers rely on the recording of precise numbers for inventory and harvest levels, First Nations 
people tend to collect more general information and communicate it orally.  Reconciling the two 
modes of knowledge gathering and creation is obviously a difficult task.  Since these non-
quantitative understandings cannot really be translated into scientific language, they often are 
seen to drop out of the database.60 The point has also been made that TEK cannot be taken out of 
context, that separating the information from the source or space makes it meaningless. Some go 
further to suggest this may even be unethical.  
However, Aboriginal individuals and their communities have a vested interest in sharing 
their knowledge when it comes to effective, responsible resource management. There is much for 
forest “managers” to learn from the elders, and those who have lived most closely with the 
forest. They have what should be considered a privileged knowledge, one specific to their land 
and tree species that knows no timeline. While resource companies have a vested interest in 
production and profit, it is the Aboriginal communities who will be most effected by how their 
resources are managed. They are thus faced with a dilemma: do they make the effort and take the 
time to share what it is they know, not knowing if it will be used appropriately and for the benefit 
of the resource, or do they simply withhold this information?  
                                                 
60 Paul Nasdasy. “The Politics of TEK: Power and the “Integration” of Knowledge”. Artic Anthropology. Vol. 36 No 
1-2. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1999) 1-18.  
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Aboriginal “people wish to share knowledge, but the context has changed and knowledge 
now has to be protected to avoid exploitation. Indigenous people are concerned that their 
knowledge is being labeled and sold.”61 There is thus a concern here about intellectual property 
rights. Winona LaDuke asserts: “We who live by this knowledge have the intellectual property 
rights to it, and we have the right to tell our stories ourselves. There is a lot to learn from our 
knowledge, but you need us to learn it.”62 
If we are to believe that this knowledge is not being sought out properly or ethically by 
non-Aboriginals and not used appropriately, we have to ask--why? Is it because the will does not 
exist to incorporate the knowledge as it exist, without codifying or dismantling it to fit into 
Western scientific systems, or is it because this is in fact impossible? We can go further from this 
to ask whether or not it should even be attempted. Regardless of the answer, it is these power 
relations between and within the systems that are of greater interest to this study.  
3.7 Challenges for Governance 
“Governance” would be much easier to define if it was an activity or process conducted 
solely by “government”. In reality, as is evident in the partnership literature and in the discussion 
on the state, market and civil society, governing is the responsibility of myriad institutions and 
actors. Phillips provides an apt definition: “self-organizing, inter-organizational networks which 
exhibit interdependence, sustained game-like exchanges where the interactions are rooted in 
trust.”63 He also suggests that governing involves a purpose, a set of actors, a domain to be 
governed and a process of governing. It is more than what states and governments do. It involves 
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an array of humanly constructed processes that determine how interactions will lead to specific 
outcomes.64 
Though it seems self-evident, there has been a tangible shift from “government” to 
“governance”. This shift, 
…involves decentring, flexibility, professionalisation, and forms of authority that rely on 
reputation and demonstrated competence rather than coercive control. Leadership is 
achieved through exemplary performance and encouragement of others. At the same time 
information flows laterally, not only within government and within corporations and 
associations, but across their boundaries. The lattice is the frame for organising in society 
as a whole.65  
 
It is generally agreed upon that governance has changed and is continuing to do so. What 
was once hierarchical and coercive is now more like a network or community of actors capable 
of not only delivering goods and services, but performing actions associated with governance as 
well. But, as some authors suggest, this change comes with a unique set of challenges. According 
to one article, “for modern states, the problem has become one of maintaining ultimate control 
yet sharing the exercise of public authority”.66 In essence, government has to ensure that the 
rowers are not wandering off course and that as steerers, they retain the ability and power to set 
them straight. The rowers, in turn, have to ensure they have the capability to fulfill their new 
responsibilities and all that comes with them.  
There is much for the central authority, likely the state, to do to support the other sectors 
towards their common goals. According to Paquet, effective governing systems require:  
Rights and authorities enshrined in rules; resources (i.e. the array of assets made available to 
individuals and institutions such as money, time, information and facilities); competencies 
and knowledge (i.e. education, training, experience and expertise) and organisational capital 
                                                 
64 Ibid. 
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(i.e. the capacity to mobilise attention and to make effective use of the first three types of 
resources).67   
 
This line of thinking indicates that the state should be moving away from the director role 
to one of facilitator. While this might seem like mere semantics, the difference will play out in 
practice. For instance, with regards to the community advisory boards, Mistik is paying for 
people to be involved in the comanagement process. Whether or not this actually enhances their 
capacity remains to be seen. What is lacking is any support from government to educate, train or 
support the community members who live closest to the resource to become actively involved in 
the business side of the management. While Mistik is giving micro-credit loans to small 
operators, the government is taking a passive role in both stewardship and community 
development.  
Attention also needs to be paid to the end result of partnerships. All the sectors need to 
work together towards “creating, managing and maintaining governing systems that are 
accountable, responsible, and transparent (ART)”.68 Phillips claims government is stressed and is 
struggling to achieve these goals, while the private and voluntary sectors have been found to “fail 
the ART test” outright. There is little mention elsewhere in the literature on policy networks and 
partnerships and how ART might be secured. While authors such as Paquet and Picciotto spend a 
great deal of time delineating who is best able to provide a service, there is no mention of what 
the implications might be if they fail in their endeavour. 
If partnerships incorporate measures towards ART, this could be considered another 
predictor of success. Regardless, while the dissemination of power and responsibilities amongst 
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members of the private and third sector continues, the role of the state has not been minimized. It 
remains an integral force in society, one that must adapt to its new roles as team member, 
facilitator and capacity-builder.  
3.8 Conclusion 
Three major themes emerge from the literature.  The first is that partnerships do not exist 
in a vacuum; rather they are subject to external forces or motivations, such as societal 
arrangements and institutions.  The political economy literature identifies these forces.  
Partnerships are also affected by their own internal dynamics; behavioural theory indicates what 
some of these forces might be.   
The second theme concerns access and benefit sharing. In terms of access, some actors in 
society are better suited to deliver certain goods and services, and most will be delivered by 
partners from the different sectors.  The benefits relating to this delivery will be affected, if not 
determined, by the power relations between the partners. 
The final theme relates to the imbalance of power that may or may not be inherent in co-
management of natural resources.  Creating partnerships between different sectors means having 
partners with different goals and motivations, often with different levels or types of knowledge. 
The comparison of western knowledge and TEK has shown the difficulties this creates for 
sustainable resource management. 
This section has taken us from the more general theories and concepts, such as political 
economy and the roles of state, market and civil actors, to more specific issues relevant to the 
case study.  It is important to note that many of the theories explored here have rarely, if ever, 
been applied to existing partnerships and certainly not to those between corporate entities and 
Aboriginal communities.  
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The discussion about the different types of knowledge and the question on whether 
western and TEK can be integrated is nothing new to natural resource studies, but it is an issue 
highly relevant to this case study so it does require further exploration.  The following chapter 
will address the implications all of these issues have for the case study, while chapter four will 
highlight the different partner’s perceptions of these same issues. 
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Chapter Four:  
The Purpose, Partners and Power Sharing of the Partnership 
4.1 Introduction 
While the preceding chapter provides some insight into features common to partnerships 
and information on issues relevant to co-management, this chapter will illustrate key features of 
the Mistik Management case study and the partners within it.  Of special interest to this case are 
the values and resulting motivations of the partners involved and how differing motivations can, 
and have, contributed to discord.  It is also important to explore here why certain  sectors/actors 
are better suited to deliver a good or service, how the sectors interact in the delivery, and the 
impact power—both the type and degree wielded—has on the interaction.  The sharing of 
knowledge will also be addressed here as it directly affects the sharing of power and has special 
relevance to this case study. 
4.2 Values and Motivations of the Partners 
Public-private partnerships bring together actors from different sectors, often with very 
different values and motivations. Some of the differences are inherent--private actors seek profit, 
and government agencies are designed to put the public first, but motivations tend to be more 
complex.   
Generally speaking, co-management agreements have arisen due to conflict over rights 
and or use of a specific resource.  Often there is a local user involved who wishes greater access 
or sharing of benefits vying against a central authority.  With regards to forestry co-management, 
one author writing specifically on the Mistik FMLA documented what she identified as causative 
factors: 
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Conventional management practices have failed to sustainably manage forest resources, meet 
community needs, or meaningfully involve local resource users in management; lack of respect 
for, and integration of, local (traditional) knowledge and management systems in forest 
management; declining and overexploited forest resources; wildlife population crises or 
perceived crisis; political incentives, aboriginal rights, and land claims; economic and industrial 
development pressures; local interest in protecting species and ensuring wise harvesting 
practices; pressure from environmental groups; government decentralization and the devolution 
of management and research responsibilities to the forest industry and the need to appreciate 
forest values other than timber.69 
 
Kernaghan proposes that partnerships enable agencies to achieve goals they could not 
otherwise achieve, preserving the same level of service with less financial and human resources. 
Partnerships are thought to increase both the providers and clients’ sense of ownership and 
enhance their feelings of personal empowerment.70 This information points to motivations of the 
actors involved and what the end goals of a partnership should be. 
The ‘who’, ‘what’, ‘when’ and ‘where’ questions prompted by political economy, while 
they are important, are not particularly compelling. They are details used to tell a story.  The 
questions that are most relevant to this study and arguably most important to the field of political 
studies are ‘why’ and ‘how’.  What caused the government to enter into an agreement with 
MLTC, Mistik to engage the community members, and members of the Public Advisory Group 
to come on board, and how does the partnership work?   
Susan Strange uses the language of social, political and economic arrangements and 
values that act as the foundation for the greater system.  While government, industry, Aboriginal 
communities and NGOs all exist within the same system, they have very different characteristics 
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as defined by Strange.  These arrangements and values impact the relationships among the 
partners. Analysis of these factors is used to answer the ‘why’ behind the partnerships.   
4.3 Partner #1: The Government of Saskatchewan 
With regards to the Government of Saskatchewan, the familiar rubric of downsizing, 
efficiency and lack of expertise has resulted in Saskatchewan Environment decreasing its level of 
involvement in forestry operations.  While the then NDP government maintained its core Crown 
corporations, it also entered into a number of economic and business partnerships with private 
industry.  Not all of these arrangements have been successful, such as with the Meadow Lake 
pulp mill.  This government is increasingly recognizing the role of the private sector and has 
devolved a number of responsibilities onto it.  Some of the underlying goals within government, 
as evidenced in all the literature on public-private partnerships, are fiscal restraint, efficiency and 
value for money.  These are goals shared by private industry.  Where the two sectors diverge is 
the interest in the public good.  It may be that the Government of Saskatchewan believed it was 
in the public’s best interest to engage the MLTC in forestry management and not just for the sake 
of devolution of their responsibilities.   
As the partner with government in this case is an Aboriginal body, additional factors need 
to be considered.   Basic legislation and a number of court cases such as Sparrow and 
Delgamuukw have re-emphasized the rights of Aboriginal people in regards to natural resources 
and the potential for their greater involvement in day-to-day management.  The “duty to consult” 
is further evidence of this.   
Under the BNA Act, provincial governments have jurisdiction over all publicly held 
forestland not located in national parks.  In Saskatchewan, the provincial government operates 
under the regulations pursuant to the Forest Resources Management Act. The purpose of the act 
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is to “promote the sustainable use of forest land for the benefit of current and future generations 
by balancing the need for economic, social and cultural opportunities with the need to maintain 
and enhance the health of forest land.”71  
The province has obviously recognized that these are not goals to be achieved alone, 
rather they require collaboration with companies such as Mistik and communities within their 
FMLA. 
An important distinction to be made in co-management with Aboriginal communities is 
the recognition in the courts of their right to be consulted on matters regarding resource 
management.  The constitutionalization of these rights traces back to Section 35 of the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms in 1982. While the constitutional amendment did not create any new 
rights:  
The provision recognizes and affirms the "existing Aboriginal and treaty rights" of the 
Aboriginal peoples of Canada, and situates those rights outside the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms with its section 1 limitation clause. The absence of terms defining 
the rights placed the task of interpreting the scope of section 35 squarely in the judicial 
sphere.72 
 
Aboriginal treaty rights are obviously highly relevant to this comanagement study.  First 
Nations in Canada have inherent rights to their traditional lands; land use planning and natural 
resource management must respect this.  There have been a number of court decisions made in 
the last 20 years that have clarified and strengthened this position. In R. vs. Sparrow (1990), 
Ronald Sparrow’s specific fishing practices, while considered illegal in the eyes of the province, 
were considered by the Supreme Court to be evidence of “inherent Aboriginal and treaty rights”.  
                                                 
71Government of Saskatchewan. Forest Resources Management Act. (Regina: Government of Saskatchewan, 1996) 
c.F-19.1, s.3.  
72 Mary Hurley. Aboriginal and Treaty Rights. (Ottawa: Parliamentary Research Branch, Government of Canada, 
2000). PRB 99-16E. Found online 28/12/07: http://dsp-psd.communication.gc.ca/Collection-
R/LoPBdP/EB/prb9916-e.htm  
 
 55
This was a landmark case in the interpretation of the Charter, as it was the first to uphold Section 
35 and actually illustrated the government’s fiduciary duty to Aboriginal people.  Another 
important case that is relevant to this study is that of Delgamuukw (1997) wherein the Supreme 
Court recognized Aboriginal title as the right to the land itself, not merely the use of the land for 
traditional purposes. However, while Aboriginal treaty rights can be seen as a motivating factor 
for government to involve them in natural resource management, the point must also be made 
that Aboriginals do not hold the right to log outside their traditional territory for commercial 
benefit. This will be explained further in the discussion of MLTC communities’ motivations for 
partnership.  
The “duty to consult” is another factor that needs to be taken into consideration in this 
case. The Government of Saskatchewan has explained this duty: 
Consultation must take place before any legislation, policy, program or other activity that 
could adversely affect Treaty or Aboriginal rights is developed or put in place. The 
consultation process is essential because it may lead to a different approach being taken 
that would not adversely affect Treaty or Aboriginal rights or would lessen the effect on 
those rights. As well, failing to consult could result in the courts ordering that the 
government not proceed or that the action be stopped, struck down or become the subject 
of damages. The risk of government action adversely affecting existing Treaty or 
Aboriginal rights and being found unconstitutional in the absence of consultation means 
that First Nations and Métis people are much more than a ‘stakeholder’...73 
 
  The responsibility of consulting with Aboriginal stakeholders was agreed upon by MLTC 
with the signing of the first FMLA with the province. However, the style or practice of co-
management may or may not represent a greater achievement than the mere undertaking of a 
consultation process required by law. There are varying levels of power sharing in both formal 
                                                 
73  The Government of Saskatchewan. (2006)  “Guidelines for Consultation with First Nations and Métis People: A 
Guide for Decision Makers” Found online Dec.15.06 at: 
http://www.fnmr.gov.sk.ca/html/documents/otherdocs/Guidelines_for_Consultation_web.pdf  
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and informal arrangements. One of the most interesting (and arguably most important) tasks in 
any politically based co-management study is the examination of such power relations.   
The role of the government in forestry management should not be underestimated.   They 
are still the regulators of the industry and have considerable control over Mistik’s management 
of the forest.  The province has always advocated a “use it or lose it” approach, and has actually 
taken land away from Mistik when they felt it was not being put to the best or most productive 
use.  Mistik will continue to walk a fine line in this case with trying to preserve habitat to 
maintain their Forest Standards Council certification and to meet the demands of the government 
towards productivity and profit.  Again, the province needs to be assured they will continue to 
receive value for money in this partnership.  The act of taking land away from Mistik and 
awarding it to another forestry company suggests that profit may very well be the greatest 
motivator for the government to be involved in this particular partnership.   
4.4 Partner #2: Mistik Management Ltd. 
Mistik’s motivations are somewhat more complex.  There are a number of reasons why 
Mistik chose to enter in co-management with the community boards and why they engaged in an 
extensive consultation process.  The first is mentioned above, that it was the fulfillment of a 
responsibility: 
Section 39 of The Forest Resources and Management Act of Saskatchewan imposes 
certain obligations on Mistik not only to consult with ‘Aboriginal and other people using 
land with the license area’ but to respond to their concerns and to the issues raised by 
them in relation to Mistik’s activities on the license area.74  
 
It was also a response, in some cases, to opposition from Aboriginal communities.  This 
is well documented with regards to the Canoe Narrows blockade, wherein protestors demanded 
                                                 
74 Mistik Management Ltd. Public Involvement. Found online Dec.20.06.  
http://www.mistik.ca/public_involvement.htm  
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(amongst other things), input into the management of their forestlands.  Mistik may believe, as 
mentioned previously, that partnerships enable agencies to achieve goals they could not 
otherwise achieve.  Thus, it may have entered into co-management to counter this resistance and 
to pave the way towards their desired path of forestry management.   
To determine what exactly this company’s goals are, one could turn to the content of its 
publications and website that asserts: 
Mistik Management Ltd.--a meeting place for the people of the north, Mother Nature, 
timber users, and forest workers. Our bond is a belief lived and breathed by all people 
who live in northwest Saskatchewan that the boreal forest is a special trust to be managed 
for all values ... and all users.75  
 
This company purports to share a common vision with northerners, of a management plan 
that “provides the most good to the most people over the longest period of time” and that it 
manages not only for the greatest yield but for the natural, economic and social environment as 
well.  These phrases suggest there is more to the consultation and partnering process than mere 
obligation.  The skeptics among us might suggest this is a tool of marketing.  Mistik appears to 
have the interests of Aboriginal communities and the sustainable management of the forest at 
heart--this paints a heartwarming picture of community and industry working together towards 
solutions, the meeting of all the partners expressed needs, all towards the best long-term 
management of the forest. This picture could be quite compelling for potential investors, 
consumers of forest products, other communities interested in forest management and even 
environmentalists.  So, some part of this process for Mistik could very well be strategic.  A 
question that follows from that is whether or not that makes the company any less credible or the 
partnering process any less legitimate? 
                                                 
75 Mistik Management Ltd. Home Page. Found online Dec.20.06. www.mistik.ca  
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This issue might be better illustrated with another example of Mistik’s operations.  In 
2006, it expressed an intention to achieve Forest Stewardship Council certification.  Would 
Mistik, or any forestry company for that matter, undertake the FSC process, achieve certification 
and keep it a secret?  The answer is obviously, no.  The bottom line, as with any industry, is 
profit.  However, the pursuit of profit, as many companies have shown over the last number of 
years, can be tempered with concern for the natural and social environment.  Indeed, a number of 
companies have found ways to fulfill the triple bottom line, conducting business in a manner that 
is economically, socially and environmentally sound.  There is no reason to believe that Mistik 
does not have the potential to achieve this as well.  Its goals may be just as claimed: to manage 
the forest for the greatest good, for the greatest number of people, for the greatest span of time.  
One test of this company’s commitment has come now that it has achieved FSC certification, as 
this carries with it specific considerations for Indigenous people’s rights (Appendix 3). 
4.5 Partner #3: The Community Co-Management Boards 
The fact that Mistik was created by the Meadow Lake Tribal Council may have 
influenced its community members to get involved in the consultation process.  This was 
presented as a way for people to have their voices heard and to have some control over their 
natural environment.  One point that is particularly interesting in relation to the literature on 
political economy is that community members were not presented with a multitude of choices for 
forestry management.  The discourse examines choices that actors make in specific 
circumstances. Was co-management really a choice for the MLTC communities? While 
participation by each individual member on the board is a choice, it should be noted that they 
were only offered one form of management. 
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As mentioned previously, Aboriginals in Canada do not hold the right to log outside of 
their traditional territory, which very much limits their ability to engage in forestry practices.   
There have been a number of court decisions before and after 1982 that make a distinction 
between traditional activities permitted by treaties and those deemed for commercial profit that 
are not.76 Logging has been classified as an activity for commercial gain, one that was not 
practiced by Aboriginals before European contact, so no inherent right exists.  More succinctly, 
“where the practice, custom or tradition arose solely as a response to European influences then 
that practice, custom or tradition will not meet the standard for recognition of an Aboriginal 
right.”77 A partnership such as the one with Mistik could be seen by some as a necessary 
arrangement to engage in. 
One also has to consider the social and economic conditions in these communities.   
There is a high level of poverty on Saskatchewan’s reservations and those within the MLTC are 
no exception.  People struggle to find work and there are few opportunities close to home.  There 
is also a strong push for increased economic development in the Northwest, centred on the 
exploitation of natural resources.  Aboriginal leaders are seeking the greatest benefit from these 
resources as there are few other opportunities for wealth creation. Mistik has created over 58,000 
person days of work annually for residents of Northern Saskatchewan, many who are Aboriginal. 
The company has injected a significant amount of money into the MLTC communities in 
their funding of the boards, which has undoubtedly influenced people’s involvement and support 
for it. The fact that the boards are paid relative to the amount of timber logged and have 
complete control over how the money is spent has lead some to question the impartiality of the 
                                                 
76 R. v. Marshall, [2005], R. v. Bernard, [2005], R. v. Peter Paul [1998] supra note 17 at 249, R. v. Gladstone [1996]  
supra  note 133 at para. 57., R. v. Van der Peet, [1996], Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa 
Indians et al v. Voigt et al, (W.D. Wis. 1991). 
77 R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 at para. 73.  
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process and the implications for sustainable management of the forest.  This is a concern 
Saskatchewan Environment has echoed, though it is presently unknown as to whether it is a 
problem and needs to be changed.   
Many people got involved with the co-management process hoping the boards would 
evolve from a consulting level to that of real authority for decision-making.  While input from 
the boards has been used to draft the 20-year management plan for the region, currently no 
boards actually have the authority to make decisions. In the end, Mistik is responsible for the 
day-to-day management and is free to accept or reject input from the boards.  Regardless, board 
members have reported they feel their input is valued and has made a difference.  According to 
one community member:  
The most important thing about co-management for me is running our own (fur) block, to 
be able to look after it, to plan for the future. That’s the best thing that has ever happened 
to us, to have some control over our lives. If it wasn’t for that, then we’d have nothing 
left up here…it’s really something, you know, to manage your own life.78 
 
This is a sentiment echoed by many other members of the community boards. Thus, 
perhaps the greatest motivator for communities to get involved in co-management is the chance 
to have control over how their resource is being managed.  
There is a tendency in the literature on Aboriginal resource management to romanticize 
the culture.  It is much easier, for example, to report that a First Nations community, as opposed 
to a forestry company, would enter inter co-management out of altruism, rather than out of self-
interest or personal gain.  This is a dangerous line of thinking and one that will not capture the 
complexity of this situation.  It is reasonable to believe that there are those individuals and 
community members, regardless of their race or culture, who will become involved in a process 
                                                 
78 Diana Chambers. Co-management of Forest Resources in the NorSask Forest Management License Area, 
Saskatchewan. A Case Study. Master’s Thesis. (Calgary: University of Calgary, 1999) 16.  
 
 61
for their own benefit.  This point is especially relevant when one considers to what length and for 
what period of time Aboriginal people in this country have been bereft of power in political and 
social systems.  Entering into co-management may be one attempt to win it back. 
4.6 Partner #4: The Saskatchewan Environmental Society 
The Saskatchewan Environmental Society (SES), a member of the Public Advisory 
Group, can be considered an informal partner in the co-management process.  Located in 
Saskatoon, this environmental NGO has over 300 individual members across the country.  They 
subsist on memberships and donations, accepting no core funding from the government.  They 
have the mandate of “working towards a world in which all needs can be met in sustainable 
ways”.  SES functions to provide education to the public on environmental issues, they act as a 
watchdog against government and corporate actions and they develop environmental policy 
options in order to influence decision-makers.  They are also a registered charity, a designation 
that enhances fundraising, but also serves to hamper their ability to get involved on a more 
political basis.   
The group’s Executive Director, Allyson Brady, has become increasingly interested and 
involved in forestry and was looking to work with a company towards achieving Forest 
Stewardship Council certification.  The Canadian Boreal Institute was the impetus to this 
interest, as they were looking to fund an environmental group to do this.79  Weyerhaeuser was 
not particularly interested in the process, but Mistik was.  It first wanted to achieve Canadian 
Standards Association certification, for which it required the participation of an environmental 
group.  The decision was made for Brady to work with Mistik towards achievement of both 
standards as a representative of SES.     
                                                 
79 This could be seen as another example of NGOs altering their work or mandate to suit the interests of funders. 
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As a member of the Public Advisory Group, Mistik pays for all of Brady’s travel 
expenses in order that she is able to attend the Public Advisory meetings as well as some of the 
Community board meetings. This, in a sense, increases the capacity of the group to be involved 
in the process.  In this sense, Mistik is thereby fulfilling one of the duties of the more powerful 
partner, and one that is usually reserved for government.  Indeed, the concept of a private 
industry acting to build the capacity of the voluntary sector is another unique element of this case 
study that has farther-reaching implications for the study of partnerships.   
Brady attributes SES’s continued involvement with Mistik to other factors.  She is 
supportive of the company on a philosophical basis--because their workforce is predominantly of 
Aboriginal ancestry, money made by the company stays in northern Saskatchewan, and they 
have supported individuals in the north through acts such as co-signing loans for local 
contractors. It appears to Brady that profit is not Mistik’s only goal and that it is truly a different 
kind of forestry company.   
The Saskatchewan Environmental Society, and the executive director in particular, have 
been accused of being “corporate lackeys” for working so closely with Mistik, criticism that has 
not fallen on deaf ears.  The group is mindful of its responsibility to remain objective through 
their ongoing relations with the company, and as always, is accountable to their members and 
board.  That being said, they will continue to work with Mistik as long as the partnership 
continues to benefit both parties and Mistik maintains its sustainable management of the forest.  
The group does not report feeling “incorporated”; rather they see themselves as working with 
Mistik towards mutually beneficial goals.    
There are obvious commonalities amongst the partners in terms of their motivations.  On 
the one hand, each group appears to have laudable goals--of sustainable forestry management 
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and meaningful engagement of stakeholders.  On the other hand, they are also acting out of their 
own self-interest.  The forestry company has profit as a chief motive, as does the government (if 
perhaps to a lesser degree) and the community boards want control over the management of their 
resource.  The environmental group wishes to see management that is environmentally sound and 
socially beneficial and this process offers them some influence.  
4.7 Challenges for the Partners 
 
There are a number of potential challenges inherent in any type of partnership that 
involves private actors. These challenges include, but are not limited to: 1) the corruptive 
potential of partnerships with powerful private-sector organizations; 2) working out a balance 
between transparency and secrecy; 3) contrasting approaches to risk management between the 
government and the private industry; 4) the distancing of citizens/users from the government as 
they are more closely engaged with the corporate body; and 5) blurred lines of accountability.80  
Specific to this case study, there are additional challenges that stem from each groups’ 
motivations for involvement in the co-management process.  To take the perspective of the 
forestry company, it is faced with balancing the government’s “use it or lose it” mandate against 
the criteria of the FSC certification and the wishes of the ENGO partner.  It also needs to keep 
the community advisory boards engaged in the process, whether it be through increasing their 
power or decision making authority or by offering them other more tangible benefits.  All of the 
different interests in these forestlands need to be accounted for and addressed if this company 
hopes to continue its success along the triple bottom line. 
Partnerships are more than new types of management. Rather, they are, as one author has 
suggested, a hybrid of management and governance.  Indeed, as Mistik has taken over the 
                                                 
80 John Langford. “Governance Challenges of Public–Private Partnerships” In Collaborative Government: Is There 
a Canadian Way? ed. Susan. Delacourt & Donald Lenihan (IPAC. Toronto: Ontario, 1999). 
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management of the forest in Northwest Saskatchewan, it has also taken the government’s place 
in consultation and engagement of the citizenry and have thus, taken a role in governance.  In 
addition, if it can find a way to increase the power of the co-management boards, it may end up 
providing Aboriginal communities within the MLTC an opportunity for a form of self-
government.  Only time will reveal the true implications of this particular partnership, but as it 
stands today, there is potential for Mistik Management to change the face of forestry in this 
province.  Its success will undoubtedly depend upon the functionality of its partnerships. 
4.8 Where do the Partners Fit in Goods and Service Delivery 
Boulding’s triangle helps to explain the relationships between the actors in the case 
study; it illustrates which actor is the most logical choice to control/deliver goods or services and 
shows areas where partnerships are likely to form: 
 
Province of Saskatchewan 
       
  
 
 
 
 
 
                   Public Advisory Group 
      Mistik Management               Co-Management Boards 
 
There are two points to take away from this. The first is that natural resources are 
common pool goods that exhibit particular challenges—especially overuse. Theory suggests they 
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need to be governed and managed for the good of the many.  Thus, a natural resource should be 
managed by either civil society alone, a partnership between civil society and the government, a 
partnership between civil society and a private actor, or a combination of all three. It is difficult 
to imagine either the co-management boards or the PAC taking full responsibility for forestry 
management, so a combination is likely the best approach. (There might, however, be another 
civil group, like a specific community or group of communities that would have the capacity to 
manage the forests.)   
The second point is that different actors can at times operate like one of the other sectors.  
This is seen when Mistik lends money to operators, when co-management boards govern 
resources and distribute benefits, or when the Province of Saskatchewan enters into private 
business ventures, like the Meadow Lake mill.  Each actor has the potential for success in 
entering into these other areas, but they will each meet with their own respective challenges.   
To shift the focus from the product to the process, consider the action of capacity 
building. This has traditionally been the role of the state, building the capacity of civil society to 
enter into new areas of service or program delivery.  With regards to the Mistik case study, no 
one is building the capacity of the community members to become more involved in forestry 
management. The province has essentially abdicated its role to interact with and consult forest 
users, focusing more on the legislative and enforcement aspect of forestry management.  They 
are truly the hierarchical force in this example, but they do not engage the civil sector to the 
extent usually seen in a true PPP, or as indicated in Boulding’s triangle.   
Civil society has been identified in this theory as best suited to care for common pool 
resources, but in this example, neither the capacity nor the supporting legislation currently exists 
to make it happen.  In truth, Mistik as the private entity has far more control over the 
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management of the resource, so the success of the partnership will likely have more to do with 
how and to what extent it shares this control with the communities and how well the two groups 
work together.   
4.9 Power Sharing in the Partnership 
Susan Strange suggests it is not enough to ask who has the power in any given situation; 
we need to dig deeper to discover its source. It can be command or coercive force; it can stem 
from wealth or ideas. She classifies power as being either structural or relational. Sources of the 
former are relevant to the Mistik case study; they include control over security, control over 
production, control over credit and control over knowledge, beliefs and ideas. Mistik 
Management, together with the province, has control over the production of timber and wealth 
creation for individuals in the Aboriginal communities. The forestry company has also been 
giving start up loans to local contractors and forest workers. The argument could also be made 
that it holds the balance of power in the knowledge sector: the majority of traditional knowledge 
once held by Aboriginal communities has been made public and Mistik already has access to 
extensive sampling, maps and the latest scientific data on forest management.  
Mistik’s power over production is guaranteed through the Forest Management Act 
(FMA) and its related Forest Management License Agreement (FMLA) for the region, and has 
been exercised in part through the creation of the 20 year Forest Management Plan (FMP). 
Mistik exerts its control over production through the 20 year FMP, which the Government of 
Saskatchewan must sign onto to bring into effect. The creation of the FMP is Mistik’s 
responsibility, but it did open the process up to stakeholders, specifically the Public Advisory 
Group. What remains to be seen is if it actually ceded any control over the management strategy, 
or if they really did just consult; the two concepts are in no way synonymous. 
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Mistik has a contract with an independent auditor, KPMG, who assesses the company’s 
performance and makes the findings public.  In areas where it is deemed to be falling short of 
identified goals, the onus is on both the company and the government to work towards solutions.  
The role of the government in forestry management should not be underestimated. It is still the 
regulator of the industry and has considerable control over Mistik’s management of the forest. 
The province has always advocated a “use it or lose it” approach, and has actually taken land 
away from Mistik when it felt it was not being put to the best, most productive use.  
The MLTC communities do maintain some semblance of power in the comanagement 
relationship, though it is difficult to classify. The owners and operators of Mistik still recall the 
events of the Canoe Narrows blockade and the resistance the community members were able to 
mount to their logging efforts. Since that time, there have been a number of incidences and 
protests involving individuals and families, such as when Mistik has planned to log too close to 
their cabins or trap lines. It seems community members remain able to impact Mistik’s 
operations, though it appears to be on a case-by-case basis and not on their forest practices in 
general. So power over production is being shared, but to a limited extent.  
Mistik enhances its power by actively engaging in lending to the communities and their 
entrepreneurs. While Mistik is not the only source of credit available to contractors in the MLTC 
communities, it suggests it is offering credit to people who would not otherwise be able to gain 
access. According to Al Balisky from Mistik Management: 
For many years, Mistik was the bank and assumed all the risks. The banks wouldn’t 
touch a lot of these contractors. On behalf of the mills, Mistik took all of the risk and 
made a tremendous outlay of money initially. Then to get contractors up to speed, 
dedicated staff went that extra mile to ensure they would succeed.81 
 
                                                 
81 Jeannie Armstong, “Mistik Management Ltd. Takes Homegrown Approach to Forest Management”. Star Phoenix 
(Saskatoon, SK:  July 28, 2005) E5.  
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As of 2005, it was reported that Mistik was assuming “50 per cent of the risk on a large 
number of Beaver River Community Futures Development Corporation- related loans…(and 
that) Mistik routinely provides financial management and administrative assistance for 
contractors.”82 
In addition, Mistik purports to be enhancing the capacity of the Aboriginal communities 
to become more involved in forest planning. It is contributing to this goal by paying the 
Community Advisory Boards $.50 for every tree logged within their Forest Management Unit 
(FMU). This money would ideally be used to enhance the board members’ capacity to take part 
and travel to meetings, but they are free to spend it however they wish. While this may not 
reflect the initial purpose of the funding, there may be implications here for the enhancement of 
communities’ social capital. Regardless of how the money is used, the fact that Mistik provides it 
affords the company another level of power in the communities and co-management process. 
It initially appears that the relationship between Mistik and the Community Advisory 
Boards would fit in the IAPP’s “collaborate” category. At least this would be the conclusion if 
one reviews the contents of Mistik’s website, the goals of the co-management agreement and the 
plans for the Public Advisory Committee.  However, after informal discussion with community 
members and other relevant stakeholders, it appears Mistik engages more on a level of 
“consultation”.  The reasons for this categorization are supported by survey results in the 
following chapter. 
Assuming the collaboration scenario was actually the case, there is an important caveat 
that weakens it and makes it seem feasible—Mistik’s reports assert advice and information will 
be incorporated “to the maximum extent possible”. This opens up an important discussion for 
this case and co-management in general.  Rarely will profit and the greatest possible (i.e. “most 
                                                 
82 Ibid., E5.  
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efficient”) use of a resource be sacrificed for cultural, environmental or individuals’ concerns.  
Some communities may not want to see their resources mined, logged or fished at all, but 
economic forces require it.  Mistik Management and the Province of Saskatchewan are 
compelled to consult on their forestry practices, and will make certain allowances, but the bottom 
line, as in the vast majority of capitalist ventures, is profit.  It has been shown that the province’s 
goal is to ensure that the Annual Allowable Cut is adhered to and that those who will not cut at 
that rate may have to forfeit land within their FMLA.  Where does this leave Mistik 
Management?  If it wishes to remain in operation and create wealth for itself and its employees, 
and the communities in which they operate, can Mistik afford to share decision-making power to 
the extent seen with true “empowerment” (as categorized by the IAPP)?  This would obviously 
depend on the types of decisions being made at the community level and the capacity that exists 
within the communities and their boards to be full partners in the process.  This line of thinking 
will be explored further in chapter four. 
Co-management boards are a power structure within a pre-existing superstructure. There 
are town or band councils in place in these communities; there are also well established class 
systems based upon wealth and familial ties.  As discussed in Olson’s work, people join groups 
for different reasons, sometimes for their own personal gain. In small communities in particular, 
the same people tend to be involved in different projects--people who can afford to spend the 
time and money required.  Anyone from a small town or reserve community will recognize this.  
Co-management boards are thus more likely to be made up of the resource users, such as 
fishermen and trappers as well as contractors, members of town council and people who hold 
positions of power in the community, be it formal or informal.  Some of these people stand to 
benefit from their association with Mistik, especially the contractors.  Others benefit personally 
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from being on the boards as they participate in decisions that affect their livelihoods.  All of 
these people are responsible for how their community benefits as they decide how the stumpage 
fees are spent.  This is not to say there is any level of corruption or conflict of interest associated 
with co-management boards, rather that there are internal dynamics that affect access and benefit 
sharing and they should be considered. 
4.10 Sharing of Knowledge in Co-management 
One more good produced by the partnership is knowledge.  There have been instances 
wherein Aboriginal people were brought into co-management arrangements in order to gain 
access to their traditional ecological knowledge. As mentioned earlier, this presents a dilemma 
for some: while they wish to work together towards sustainable forestry planning, they worry 
their information when taken out of context will not be appropriate and that where it is, they will 
not benefit from sharing it. Conversely, the point has been made that the sharing of their 
knowledge can have greater implications:  
Aboriginal people have a strong desire to see their knowledge and traditions inform the 
decision- making that impacts their lives and lands. The study of tek is therefore not just 
an esoteric or academic exercise; it can be and has been utilized as a powerful tool in the 
establishment of Aboriginal influence in environmental and resource management 
regimes.83 
  
So, while the sharing of knowledge may be for the greater good, the question remains 
whether or not there should be any tangible remuneration. Intellectual property rights enter into 
the equation, especially in the cases of communities that live in poverty. Once their traditional 
knowledge is made public, they lose any future opportunity of benefiting from it on their terms.  
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Their knowledge is treated in the majority of legal systems as part of the public domain, 
so it can be used by virtually anyone as soon as it is in print form. The idealist would see this as 
beneficial as it may enhance the sustainability of other resource management schemes, while the 
realist recognizes corporations are the most likely group to get involved and exploit the 
information for profit with no resulting benefit to the communities from whence it came.84 
Efforts have thus been made to establish protocols for sharing Indigenous knowledge, though it 
does not appear they are widely used in Canada.85 
An obvious disharmony between the two types of knowledge inherent in co-management 
is a theme prevalent in the literature. The implications of this disharmony are far-reaching and 
represent a significant challenge to the success of any management arrangement. The differences 
between western scientific and Indigenous knowledge are fairly obvious, but bear repeating. 
Western knowledge tends to be compartmentalized; it has a unique language and is 
communicated in written form. Indigenous knowledge is holistic and based upon experience and 
observation. It too has its specific language and is communicated chiefly through oral 
communication, such as story telling. Some people resist even referring to Indigenous knowledge 
as “knowledge”; it is not so much a way of knowing as it is a way of being.86 Attempts to 
reconcile the two forms have met with varied success, but the challenges are fairly consistent: 
TK cannot be easily separated from the broader socio-context that gives it meaning and 
value, without trivializing or misrepresenting this knowledge. Nor can it be divorced 
from the people who own and want to effectively control and apply this knowledge to 
advance their interests. Yet, this is precisely what happens when environmental managers 
and conservation bureaucrats come looking for TK.87 
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online May 6, 2007. http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-9327-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html  
85 Personal conversation with Dr. Kelly Bannister, researcher at University of Victoria. December 29, 2006.  
86 Paul Nasdasy. “The Politics of TEK: Power and the Integration of Knowledge. In Arctic Anthropology. Vol 36 No 
1-2. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1999).  
87 Marc Stevenson. Traditional Knowledge in Environmental Management? From Commodity to Process. Working 
Paper 14. (Edmonton: Sustainable Forest Management Network, 1998). Used with permission.  
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  It seems very much like trying to fit a square peg into a round hole; if it is at all possible; 
the square will have to be altered in order for it to fit. Many writers, Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal alike suggest it truly isn’t possible and that the attempt essentially limits the ability of 
Aboriginal populations to participate in resource management in any meaningful way. It seems 
that some scientists and resource managers assume that what cannot be quantified is either not 
real, or not relevant: 
There are categories in the field of scientific resource management which appear to have 
no analogues in TEK. This creates the illusion that First Nations people have nothing to 
say regarding these topics. Examples of this type are categories such as “mining” and 
“forestry”. Though Aboriginal people certainly used both minerals and trees in precontact 
times, their practices had little resemblance to contemporary mining or forestry. The 
knowledge that they did possess concerning the location of these resources and how to 
obtain them are seen as rudimentary or outdated, unable to provide even supplementary 
data for foresters…88  
 
This is not to say that integrating western and Indigenous knowledge is an impossibility, 
but it certainly seems so taken from a purely scientific perspective. The purpose of this thesis 
however is not to suggest how to reconcile the two concepts,89 but to illustrate how they conflict 
and to identify the power relations at the root of the struggle.  
From the inception of a co-management arrangement, the dominant culture is in control. 
The language of the agreements tends to be in English, using concepts such as resource 
“management” and terms like “harvest” and “yield”. Some writers on the topic suggest 
Aboriginal people are essentially forced to accept the “scientific” way of managing resources 
and that little effort is made to include or even acknowledge the specific experience based 
knowledge possessed by the First Nations, or their traditional notions of living with the trees, 
fish and wildlife.  
                                                 
88  Nasdasy, 7. 
89 Firket Berkes gives some suggestions on how this might be accomplished in Sacred Ecology: Traditional 
Ecological Knowledge. (Philadelphia: Taylor & Francis, 1999) 28.  
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This harkens back to what Foucault suggests concerning the creation of truth. The 
dominant culture decides what knowledge and language is the most appropriate in the 
management system and often cannot, or will not, open the discourse to other ways of thinking 
or knowing. Furthermore, through what is essentially the extraction of knowledge from 
Aboriginal communities, the locus of control is continually reinforced.  
While some western scientists suggest traditional knowledge is a ploy for Aboriginal 
communities to wrest back some control over natural resources, other non-Aboriginal academics 
see the move to access this knowledge as yet another example of exploitation. According to one 
writer, now that Aboriginal lands have been taken over, resources harvested and populations 
sufficiently marginalized, the next logical step is to access and gain control over their traditional 
knowledge.90 They argue this would likely work better when it is made to look like 
‘consultation’. Others make the argument that it is best to access traditional knowledge and make 
it public before it is gone. Some see the traditional lives of the elders fading due to the increasing 
modernization of Aboriginal communities and worry that their lessons and knowledge will fade 
away with them. 
Co-management of natural resources is obviously political, both in its operating structure 
and process. The prior chapter described how the concept of power relates to the process from 
the sources of power as identified by Susan Strange, to the interplay between knowledge and 
power covered by Michel Foucault to the eventual implications of the power exchanges specific 
to comanagement of natural resources. One focus was applying the knowledge/power dynamic to 
comanagement in general, with some specific considerations made for the case study of Mistik 
Management. 
                                                 
90  Marc Stevenson. Traditional Knowledge in Environmental Management? From Commodity to Process. Working 
Paper #14. (Edmonton: Sustainable Forest Management Network, 1998).  
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With regards to the Mistik case study, it is unclear whether it is even interested in 
traditional knowledge. There is no evidence in the reports provided by Mistik that any exchange 
of TEK is being undertaken. It cannot be assumed that every co-management arrangement with 
Aboriginal communities is concerned with accessing their TEK, nor can it be assumed that 
exploitation is the goal or result. Everyone who experiences or writes about co-management has 
their own perspective, based upon their values and worldview. What is essential is that all 
involved recognize what they bring to the table and that these arrangements, like all systems and 
organizations, have very specific power dynamics.  
Further research could be done in this area to find examples of co-management schemes 
that have managed to integrate both kinds of knowledge without altering either form to make it 
fit. It would be interesting to know how this knowledge could be collected, stored and 
communicated while respecting the beliefs and rights of all those involved. It is not enough to 
label this task as impossible, as any success would contribute greatly to sustainable resource 
management.  
4.11 Conclusion 
The information contained in this chapter is important for a number of reasons. First, the 
research shows that the partners all have different values, motivations and goals for entering into 
this public-private partnership.  While that can be said of many partnerships, it is safe to say this 
one in particular has significant value dissonance and faces a number of challenges as a result.  
With regards to this co-management case in particular, there are also concerns with having a 
private entity enter into areas normally the responsibility of civil society and/or the state.  This 
has obvious implications for access and benefit sharing, specifically in the sharing of power and 
knowledge.  The following chapter offers the partners’ perceptions of how power and knowledge 
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is and is not being shared in order to provide more insight into what appears to be “role-shifting” 
in Boulding’s triangle. 
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Chapter Five:  
Partners’ Perceptions of the Fundamental Nature, Value and Legitimacy of 
the Partnership 
5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview and analysis of the perceptions of 
stakeholders in the Mistik case, their views concerning the nature of the co-management 
arrangement, the value of this partnership to the MLTC communities, and its perceived 
legitimacy. 
I have been following the Mistik case for over two years and have spoken to a number of 
people in the MLTC communities, the Public Advisory Group, Mistik staff, academics and 
people with a general interest in the sustainable management of Saskatchewan’s forests.  
Throughout this time I have been gathering information and opinions of stakeholders through 
informal discussions and with a formal survey (Appendix 1).  Taken together, the survey results 
and the information shared by a diverse collection of people paints a complex picture of a unique 
partnership. 
5.2 Perceptions Regarding Community/Advisory Group Involvement in Mistik’s 
Forestry Management 
 
The theory and review of secondary data sources suggest a mixed picture of the role of 
community and advisory groups in Mistik’s operations. Two main issues were explored in the 
survey and interviews. First, the stakeholder’s knowledge of the management plan and their role 
in it, and second their general feelings about their level of involvement. One goal was to have 
respondents identify specific examples of how their input was actually used.   
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The stakeholders’ perceptions appear to differ according to the community, the 
individual’s position within it, as well as their cultural background, but within their responses, 
two major issues persisted. The first is that most people were not aware of the contents of the 
management plan and were really only able to comment on specific instances where Mistik did 
or did not respect their interests. Community board members from Buffalo Narrows gave some 
very specific examples of how Mistik respected different trap lines and widened buffer zones, 
with as many conflicting examples of where and when they did not.  There was no mention of 
the content of the management plan and it was pointed out by one individual that the document 
was too lengthy and difficult to understand, so it would likely not be read by any community 
members on the board.  
More than one stakeholder indicated that it is difficult for them to contribute to 
management plans, as they are very technical, but still somehow intuitively based. The majority 
of board and committee members do not have a scientific background, so they fear the 
information that they provide is seen as either inadequate or too difficult to incorporate.  Along 
the same vein, the 20 year FMP has been written by experts, and many stakeholders feel they do 
not have the required knowledge to analyze it.   
The second issue concerns the manner and degree of consultation undertaken by Mistik; 
the majority of respondents indicated they were not consulted to their satisfaction. Ile-a-la-
Crosse co-management board members reported that while Traditional Resource Users in the 
communities had been duly consulted, the co-management boards were not. One member 
reported that the FMP was in reality presented to the board and that their input was never 
actually sought.   
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According to Mistik, much of the input from communities is related to requests for the 
deferral of specific harvest areas, usually to accommodate interests such as trapping. There is 
also the belief amongst Mistik’s leadership that they are well aware of the communities’ general 
wishes and preferences for forestry management and that their input is continually being sought 
and utilized in every 5 year operating plan.   
As would be expected, people’s views on co-management and Mistik’s operations differ 
according to their type and level of involvement in the process, where they fit in to the bigger 
socio-economic context, and their worldview.  Some people in the MLTC communities are 
satisfied with Mistik and are not interested in getting further involved in their consultations. 
Others report they have not been adequately consulted and wish to be engaged to a greater 
degree, while some communities like Buffalo River want nothing to do with Mistik and do not 
want their traditional forestland logged by “outsiders” (even though they are partially owned by 
MLTC).91   
These discussion points reveal some of the true key features of this partnership.  First, 
neither Mistik Management, nor the MLTC communities, is involved in true co-management of 
natural resources92.  This company’s relationship with the MLTC communities is at best, 
consultation.  They do work with the co-management boards, but they do not co-manage 
resources with them.  The board is actually just another vehicle through which people voice their 
specific concerns about certain areas of interest.  While Mistik has actively engaged the boards 
on these issues, there has never been the intention to work with them on actual forestry planning. 
                                                 
91 To see some of the concerns of different communities, go to “Public Issues and Concerns Summary” on Mistik’s 
website: http://www.mistik.ca/public_involvement.html   
92 The meaning of co-management is subject to debate. The International Development Research Centre views co-
management as including those arrangements where community members have little to no power, where they are 
consulted or informed of management plans. This thesis focuses on power dynamics and power sharing, thus does 
not consider such arrangements to be true co-management.  
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The second point is that they are engaged in a consultation process. This process requires 
further examination.  The difficulty in assessing whether or not consultation has been a success 
or failure in this case is that there are differing points of view and that many people answer 
questions about it based upon their own agendas, sometimes transparent and sometimes hidden. 
The people that commend Mistik on their involvement in the communities tend to be those 
people who have directly benefited from it, as well as those employed directly by the company. 
The responses in this area fit within what the literature tells us about co-management and 
partnerships in general. If we recall the predictors of success listed in chapter three, none of these 
responses should come as a surprise.  This list also further illustrates the causes of failure. People 
who live close to a resource and depend upon it are going to want real input into how it is 
managed, regardless of whether or not they are seen as having the capacity or expertise to do so.  
It does not appear that local resource users are being put at the centre; if they were, their input 
would weigh more heavily. The potential for change here is slim; this is not one of Mistik 
Management’s goals and it is not likely something a private company would work toward.   
The MLTC communities do not have the rights to manage the forestland in northern 
Saskatchewan.  They have the right to be consulted on the management plan and to use the 
resources in traditional ways, but they do not have legal rights to these common pool resources.  
This is not written in stone however, as land claims in Canada have begun to favour Aboriginal 
bands, as seen in the Nisga’a settlement. 
The point about building networks must also be addressed. While the MLTC 
communities have partnered with Mistik and Mistik has partnered with the provincial 
government, there appears to be little coherence among the communities themselves.  Most of 
the communities, unless they are closely situated geographically, seemed to have little 
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knowledge about what was going on elsewhere.  The fact that they are not a united group further 
weakens their ability to pressure the other partners and generate changes.  They also appear to be 
alienated from the Meadow Lake Tribal Council itself; many people reported that the deal with 
Mistik was made without any community input and was essentially forced upon them.   
If one subscribes to the notion that innovations must be interdisciplinary and that security 
of livelihood can only be achieved if inequitable institutions and social arrangements are altered, 
the MLTC communities face an uphill battle.  While they are situated in a pristine part of 
Saskatchewan, have access to lakes and forests and are able to hunt and fish, institutions such as 
schools and healthcare facilities are lacking.  There are few opportunities for wealth creation and 
many people have come to rely on social assistance.  While this discussion takes us beyond 
forestry management, the point bears repeating that partnerships with Aboriginal communities 
are vastly different from all other PPPs.  Besides taking into account language and cultural 
differences, any partnership also has to contend with the fact that one of the partners is 
economically and socially disadvantaged and has a long history of disenfranchisement.   
Alleviation of these long-term problems may require change at every level of policy 
making.  So, while economic gains can be made in partnerships with private enterprises, there is 
still a dire need for government--from local councils, the MLTC, the province and the federal 
government--to work harder at leveling the playing field for community members.  There should 
be a collective goal of enhancing the capacity of the communities to become involved in real co-
management.  As of today, it does not appear that the will, or interest, to do this exists at any 
level.  
The discussion with stakeholders on this topic points to a number of issues for the co-
management process.  The first is that it is difficult for communities in general to assess whether 
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or not they are contributing to forestry management. While one person will obviously know if 
they have been consulted and to what degree, they may not know how much input their 
community has had overall. This is because the 20 year FMP is very lengthy and somewhat 
difficult to understand.   
A second issue is that community input appears to be chiefly on a case by case basis, 
which is not akin to forest planning.  For example, certain individuals’ interests may be protected 
by increasing buffer zones, but there is no guarantee that these best practices will be repeated 
elsewhere. 
This discussion reveals some significant findings as to the level of success or failure of 
this partnership. Stakeholders’ perceptions indicate there is a potential failure on community 
members’ part to be informed about the management plan. Moreover, Mistik is failing either by 
not incorporating stakeholders’ input to a significant degree, or by not making this input obvious 
or understandable to the general public.  The people who give Mistik failing grades in their 
consultation process report they have never been adequately consulted, or not so to the degree 
that they believe others have been.  Certain Métis individuals allege the company is only 
interested in hearing from Treaty Indians, while some people in Ile-a-la-Crosse think much more 
time is spent consulting in other communities like Buffalo Narrows, and the majority of people 
report that the process everywhere has just been skimming the surface of the real feelings, 
attitudes and concerns of northern residents.  Conversely, many other people give the company 
an “A for effort” as they have made, and continue to make, frequent visits into the communities 
and have spoken at length with key stakeholders and northern residents in general.   
It seems success or failure depends upon who you are talking to. From Mistik’s 
perspective, consultation has not occurred at a level the company’s leaders would like, but it has 
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enabled them to move forward with their 20 year management plan, and has afforded them their 
FSC certification.  From their standpoint, it should be considered a success.  
From the communities on the whole, it would have to be considered a failure.  While 
some people have forged healthy relations with Mistik and have protected their interests, the 
communities on the whole report that they have not had real input into forest management.  The 
reasons for this failure are not one hundred percent clear.  Mistik reports it is due to community 
members’ disinterest in forestry and the consultation process.  A number of northern residents 
indicate that while they are interested in forestry, they find it difficult to understand much of the 
information that Mistik has presented them with, that they do not have the time or the capacity to 
attend their meetings and that they are really only being given the opportunity to rubber stamp 
plans that are already in the works.  Others report not seeing the benefit in getting involved at 
any level as all the benefits of the logging, including forestry jobs, flow straight to Meadow Lake 
and do not impact their communities.  Again, peoples’ perceptions have a direct correlation with 
their own interests. The salient point here is that if the partnership is seen as a failure by any one 
of the partners, it would have to be considered a failure in its entirety.  It is not enough for a co-
management arrangement to achieve the goals and aspirations of only some of the people 
involved; if the Aboriginal communities in this case feel that they are not being involved to the 
degree they would like or that their input is being ignored, the very foundation of the 
arrangement is flawed.   
5.3 Perceptions regarding Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK) and the 
sharing of knowledge in the Partnership 
Questioning in this area was designed to determine if Mistik was accessing traditional 
knowledge from the communities and if so, how this was being accomplished. Unfortunately, the 
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questions asked of community members and Mistik staff about TEK turned out to not be very 
engaging for respondents. Most people from the communities did not relate to “traditional 
knowledge” and instead reiterated examples of specific allowances made for trap lines and 
certain animal species.  In addition, some people suggested it is difficult to know how much 
knowledge has been gathered from the communities as Mistik has spent a significant amount of 
time in the area, talking to many people on an informal or one-on-one basis. 
Mistik replied in a similar fashion, citing specific allowances being made for trapping 
interests, but was unable to clearly define what traditional knowledge really is.  Al Balisky, 
Mistik’s GM, did state: “The only ‘bona fide’ traditional knowledge we have used is related to 
avoidance of historic portage travel routes, burial sites and sites of significant personal and/or 
community importance that Aboriginal communities have requested remain undisturbed.”93 
These results support information found in the literature review, that “traditional 
knowledge” is difficult to define, and that it either does not exist to the degree that it once did or 
that much of it may have already been collected from Aboriginal communities.  It also supports 
the thinking that traditional knowledge is more than information or specific facts; it is a way of 
being, of interacting with and being part of nature.  This concept is something forestry planners 
would likely not recognize, so that when a trapper asks that a certain piece of land not be 
harvested, or berry-pickers request decreased logging activity in a specific area, they make 
allowances without consideration of the bigger picture.  
Another contributing factor to Mistik not identifying community input as “traditional 
knowledge” could be the FSC certification principle related to indigenous rights. Principle 3 calls 
for Indigenous peoples to be compensated for the application of their traditional knowledge in 
forestry operations.  This needs to be agreed upon in a formal arrangement prior to any logging 
                                                 
93 Personal communication with Al Balisky, September 12, 2007. 
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taking place.  Thus, the onus here is on the communities to identify the knowledge they hold and 
share with Mistik as “traditional knowledge” and negotiate the terms of compensation.  Until that 
is achieved, Mistik is unlikely to pursue any recognition of traditional knowledge beyond what 
they currently consider “bona fide”. 
This discussion identifies more potential reasons for failure of this co-management 
model.  Knowledge held by individuals in the community is not being identified or accessed in a 
transparent manner and it is certainly not being incorporated into forestry management in any 
meaningful way.  In addition, aspects of traditional knowledge that the community members 
have shared has neither been appropriately acknowledged nor compensated.    
5.4 Perceptions Regarding Financial Benefits and the Sharing of Power 
In order to delve further into the power relations between Mistik and the MLTC 
communities, respondents were asked to discuss how financial benefits are being shared.  
Overall, there were mixed views.  
Questions in this area elicited a number of negative responses, such as Mistik is using 
stumpage fees to buy off the communities and that the money never actually reaches the co-
management boards.  A few people responded that this money has been used to benefit the 
communities in other ways, such as the hiring of summer students to work on community 
development projects and the sponsorship of a local hockey team. Mistik places no conditions on 
these funds--the towns and boards can use them as they see fit.  
A member of the Public Advisory Group stated that this was a progressive action that no 
other forestry company in Saskatchewan has ever undertaken.  While there has been some 
concern that basing payments on stumpage fees encourages greater harvesting levels, the point 
was also made that the communities most affected by the logging would receive the greater 
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amount in stumpage fees.  Mistik reported that some of this money has been used to pay for 
participants’ travel to co-management meetings, but that most of it has gone to general projects 
in the communities.   
There was no mention of any funds being used for training or capacity-building of 
community or board members.  One community has even used the funds to hire a lawyer to 
challenge the co-management agreement.  This policy of “no-strings attached” funding could be 
viewed as a contributory factor to the failure of the partnership, if the goal was actually to get 
community members more involved.  If the goal of the money is to compensate the communities 
for the loss of surrounding timber, which appears to be the case, then the policy is likely sound.   
It also may have the effect of increasing the social capital of the community.  In addition, as the 
town councils or co-management boards have the option to spend it as they see fit, it could be a 
different way of empowering communities to better care for themselves.   
This sharing of financial resources does occur on Mistik’s terms, so it obviously impacts 
the overall sharing of power in the partnership.  Regardless of how Mistik is viewed by the 
communities, the boards or the advisory committee, it holds the majority of the power.  As Susan 
Strange has illustrated, it holds control over production, credit and knowledge.  The communities 
do have input into the management over their forests, but they do not have control over them.  
So, what kinds of power do the communities possess?  They do have the ability to alter 
Mistik’s forestry practices on a case-by-case basis; that has been proven. However, the greatest 
source of the communities’ power is their ability to resist.  This was seen in the blockade at 
Canoe Narrows, wherein MLTC realized it would have to work closer with the communities on 
forestry management and Mistik would have to get involved.  It is now being seen in Buffalo 
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River, where Mistik is not currently harvesting timber, and in certain cases where talks with 
individuals broke down and small blockades occurred.   
This form of resistance has always occurred around natural resource management and is 
on the rise as certain resources become increasingly scarce (as mentioned earlier, this is one of 
the chief motivators for co-management, but as seen in Buffalo River, it is not always an 
adequate solution). The politics of resistance is an interesting topic, though not one that has been 
specifically addressed in this thesis.  It is relevant to this study as there is dissention amongst 
some communities and boards and outright refusals to participate from others.  Within any form 
of resistance, there are at least two dynamics. There is the active rebellion and the more passive 
disengagement.  Both are occurring in the MLTC communities.  There is also a more creative 
force underfoot.  For example, in Ile-a-la-Crosse there are board members who intend to create 
community-based consultation processes and if so desired by the community members, eco-
system-based management plans.   The community would have to truly mobilize around this 
effort; it would take a significant amount of time and energy, and it would require leadership.  If 
this initiative is successful, it would have far-reaching implications for natural resource 
management in Saskatchewan and beyond. 
5.5 Perceptions Regarding the Ideal of Co-management versus the Reality: Who is 
Responsible for Reconciling the Two? 
 
Stakeholders were asked a series of questions to reflect the level of knowledge 
surrounding the concept of co-management, to find out if people are satisfied with their specific 
arrangement and, perhaps most importantly, to determine who it is they see as responsible for 
“fixing” the identified problems within the partnership in question.   
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This inquiry elicited a wide variety of responses. Some community members identified 
co-management as meaning the function of their comanagement board and nothing more, with 
no suggestions as to what the ideal form might be.  One board member identified the ideal form 
as one wherein Mistik is open and honest with the communities and subject to their influence; 
another reported the ideal as a highly transparent and well functioning board, fully representative 
of the respective community.  
A representative of Mistik reported the ideal as, yet again, a functional board with good 
governance structure and practices. Problems with the current system were noted and attributed 
to the fact that some boards (in Mistik’s opinion) are ineffectual, while others are completely 
dysfunctional.  This same respondent also indicated that any necessary changes or improvements 
to the comanagement process are the responsibility of the local communities. 
One member of the Public Advisory Group got to the root of the question, stating that 
these community boards are not true co-management models, rather they are merely for 
consultation.  This individual further suggested than many of the MLTC communities do not 
actually have the capacity for true co-management, as this would take a significant amount of 
time, expertise and commitment.  Ideally, this could all be achieved if community members had 
enough interest and the stumpage fees could be used to support their time.  While this type of 
involvement would have to come from some individual or community based initiative, it should 
also be supported by different levels of government, such as the Province of Saskatchewan and 
the MLTC tribal council. It is not the task of a forest management company to build the capacity 
of community members. 
The implications of this response are far-reaching.  The MLTC communities are in a 
partnership with both a private and state body, neither of which have the interest of ceding power 
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for forestry management.  To recall Boulding’s triangle, wherein Mistik at times behaves more 
like a civil actor, it in truth remains a private profit-driven entity. As such, there is no clear 
economic benefit for the company to enhance the capacity of communities to become more 
involved in actual management of forest resources.  Moreover, this is not something the 
Government of Saskatchewan or MLTC has mandated or even encouraged it to do.  So, while the 
communities can improve the functioning of their co-management boards and increase their 
participation in Mistik’s consultation process, there is limited opportunity for them to manage 
forestland.  This is likely why some communities have ceased to correspond with Mistik--they 
seek a level of control over forestry that will likely never be achieved in this partnership.  
Like any political arrangement, people within it tend to operate out of self-interest.  The 
Saskatchewan Environmental Society, for example, continues to work with Mistik as long as it 
works towards and adheres to environmental best practices and incorporate the group’s input into 
their management plan.  Communities like Buffalo River are looking to enhance their traditional 
land base and do not want Mistik to remove timber they feel they have no right to.  Other 
communities state they could manage the forests better, providing more jobs for the people in the 
north, but are working with Mistik for now as it is the only option and it is bringing some wealth 
into the communities. 
This line of thinking fits well with what we know about partnerships. As Susan Strange 
points out, partners that come from different sectors will have different values and priorities. In 
addition, the motivations of each group will affect how the partnership functions and what 
degree of success can be achieved.  For the most part, the people contacted in this research 
recognize that Mistik is a private entity whose motivation is profit.  Mistik is not viewed as a 
civil body, or a group that should be working to enhance the capacity or social capital of the 
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communities.  The people who reported dissatisfaction with the consultation process or distaste 
of the co-management boards indicated some improvements could and should be made by 
Mistik, but that any real change or benefits for the community would have to come from the 
provincial government or from the communities themselves.    
The “government” was mentioned by a number of people as the actor who should be 
making necessary changes and protecting the interests of the communities.  This may be due to 
the history of Aboriginal people in the north--having been placed on reservations, their 
traditional lands taken away and made to be dependent on social assistance.  They undoubtedly 
would see the government as the provider and the sector that should be righting wrongs, paying 
back what has been taken and working in the communities’ best interest.  However, it is just as 
likely that this is due to the fact that many actors in civil society are not experienced in 
negotiating with corporate bodies and do not see them as “providers” that might work in other’s 
best interests.   
5.6 Conclusion 
Until this enhancement of the communities’ capacity can be achieved, perhaps Mistik is the best 
possible actor to manage forestlands in and around the MLTC communities. It has better 
environmental practices than its counterparts; it does seem genuinely interested in maintaining 
the forests and meeting the immediate needs of the community members, it is accessible and 
accountable for its actions.   While there is no real interest in co-management per se, the staff 
actually seems to be interested in improving the consultation process.  The challenge for Mistik 
is that many people don’t really want to be merely consulted; they want an active role in how the 
forest is managed.  The challenge for the communities is that there does not appear to be room 
for this level of involvement in this particular partnership. 
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Chapter Six: 
 Summary of Major Findings, Lessons Regarding Resource Co-management 
and Further Research 
6.1 Introduction 
One of the problems I set out to investigate in this thesis is how well Mistik has engaged 
the MLTC communities in co-management of the forestry lands in their FMLA.  To illustrate the 
challenges associated with this, public-private partnerships, political economy and behavioural 
theories were used to dissect the case study and examine its internal and external dynamics. In 
addition, informal discussions and the results of a brief survey were used to identify the 
perceptions of the community and board members, Mistik staff, members of the Public Advisory 
Committee and outsiders interested in the company’s management practices. 
The primary goal of this chapter is to summarize the findings of this study and to indicate 
what the greater implications are for public-private partnerships, policy makers and institutional 
design. In addition, attention will be paid to the limits of the study and potential areas for further 
research on this topic. 
6.2 Summary of Findings 
As the political economy and PPP literature illustrate, co-management requires a 
partnership among different sectors in society.  Traditionally, this has been between state 
institutions and civil society, wherein the civil actors live close to the resource and depend upon 
it and the state works to enhance their capacity to take more responsibility for the resource.  
Together, they can work to manage a common pool good collectively and sustainably.  In this 
case, we have a private entity, Mistik Management, trying to act at times like a hierarchical 
authority, as well as a social networker or civil body, but neither role is a particularly good fit.  
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Procuring timber and making a profit has to be its driving force.  It may never be able to work 
hand in hand with communities in “true co-management”, if for no other reason than the absence 
of external incentives or benefits. It is not its job to care for people in the north or to build their 
capacity to get more involved; that has traditionally been the role of government (and is not 
something typically asked of a corporation). That being said, Mistik does appear to be interested 
in a level of corporate social and environmental responsibility and is encouraging community 
members to become more involved in the consultation process.   
This partnership exists in a tumultuous time in the forestry industry (with the fluctuating 
value of timber and the rising Canadian dollar) and a time in Saskatchewan when there is 
increasing interest and pressure for economic growth and development, especially in the north.  
To further compound the problem, the majority of people Mistik is trying to involve in forestry 
planning live in poverty and some have little interest or ability to spend time on anything other 
than making ends meet.   
All of the partners, as we would expect, are acting out of self-interest.  The problem with 
this is that their interests, because of the imbalance of power in this partnership, are not equally 
reflected in the partnership. Mistik has final say on whether not input from stakeholders is used, 
and to what degree.  They are legally bound to consult Aboriginal forest users, but there is no 
strict definition of what meaningful consultation actually is.  They need involvement from an 
environmental group for certain certifications, but they do not have to implement suggestions 
made by SES if they do not fit with their vision for the forest.  Essentially, Mistik has control 
over production and knowledge and, in some cases, credit as well.   
Much of the literature on public-private partnerships does not address power imbalances, 
assuming partners will be on equal footing.  Political economy theory offers one way to consider 
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power imbalances. Perhaps because it tends to be the state working in partnerships with civil 
society, rather than a private body, that an imbalance is assumed and not discussed.  There tends 
to be language in this discourse of both partners bringing different skills and attributes together 
into the partnership to accomplish goals neither could alone--but not of one partner holding the 
majority of power and dominating the other.  A state body behaving that way would likely not be 
tolerated in a democratic society. A private corporation, however, is much more difficult to 
control.  MLTC communities cannot vote Mistik out of power. It seems their most powerful 
action is that of resistance, something that takes far more energy and commitment. 
The point should be repeated here that just because Mistik has not done a good job in 
their consultation process does not mean they are a malicious group of people, or that their 
management plan is inherently flawed.  It has formed good working relationships with a number 
of people in different communities, it has arguably the best environmental practices of any 
forestry company in Saskatchewan and it is bringing wealth and jobs into the north.  It has also 
been diligent in attempts to engage people, holding meeting after meeting in the northern 
communities that are often not well attended.   
 The bottom line is that a for-profit corporation will likely only go so far. It is unwise to 
assume they can or should be depended upon to build community, to keep everyone else’s best 
interests at heart or to sacrifice unduly for the betterment of society.  There is significant discord 
between the values and interests of private, public and civic actors.  Hence, it is fair to say that 
any co-management system that has a private body as a partner will have a unique set of 
challenges that may or may not be reconciled.   
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6.3 Lessons Regarding Resource Co-Management Partnerships 
While a number of general implications for public-private partnerships have already been 
discussed, there are more specific concepts that need to be addressed with regards to PPPs 
involving Aboriginal populations, as well as what this all means for policy makers and 
institutional design. 
For PPPs with Aboriginal populations, there are obvious cultural differences that need to 
be taken into account.  There is also the issue of benefit sharing for the use of traditional 
knowledge and power sharing with a population that has been denied it since colonization.  Of 
most interest to this case study is the capacity of these communities to take responsibility for 
sustainable resource management.  At this point, they don’t have the opportunity to do this, but 
as in other parts of the country, interest in community-owned forestry is growing.  Any progress 
towards this goal will require the communities to come together. It will require leadership and 
full support of stakeholders.  A private company such as Mistik has little to gain by supporting 
such an initiative.  International political economy literature supports this notion, that a private 
corporation exists in the market, is subject primarily to supply and demand, with profit as its 
ultimate goal. 
 A venture such as this would have to be initiated by the community and supported by all 
levels of government-- town councils, co-management boards, the MLTC and the Province of 
Saskatchewan.  The government in this case would have to take on a role of facilitator.  While 
the logistics of this are unclear as Mistik has a 20 year FMP and there are binding agreements in 
place, any move towards community based management would require a significant shift in 
thinking and policy. 
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Implications for policymakers can be found in the literature on ART.  Phillips reminds us 
that all sectors need to work towards governing systems that are accountable, responsible and 
transparent.94 In this case, this would require the province to become more involved in the 
partnership and to take responsibility for its success or lack thereof.  It appears the move to shift 
the task of consultation onto Mistik has not worked.  It meets the bare minimum of the duty to 
consult and there are virtually no actions of capacity building taking place.  TEK has become a 
marginalized idea in this consultation process. It appears that Mistik is either not able to 
recognize it, or that it has actually been lost.  The former appears more likely.   
The Meadow Lake Tribal Council (MLTC) has not been discussed in this thesis as a 
partner.  That is because although they are owners of Mistik, the council does not appear to have 
an active role in its operations.  It is likely that certain representatives are involved, but 
determining who is and to what degree would be difficult.  It is rumoured some council members 
are board members of Mistik, but this information is not available to the public. This relationship 
again, fails the ART test outright-- any involvement of the MLTC should be made known.  
Elected officials from the MLTC could act as links between Mistik and the communities, but 
they appear to be absent.  It is interesting to note that when community members were asked who 
is responsible for improving the consultation process, no one mentioned MLTC. 
With regards to institutional design, it is not enough for government to abdicate 
responsibility for resource management to a private company and give them the task of 
consulting with Aboriginal stakeholders. There should be some level of accountability built into 
this system so that all the people dissatisfied with it have another level of recourse.  The Minister 
of the Environment has the responsibility “to promote the sustainable use of forest land for the 
                                                 
94 Peter Phillips. Governing Transformative Technological Innovation:  Who’s in Charge? (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar Publishing Inc., 2007) 68. 
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benefit of current and future generations by balancing the need for economic, social and cultural 
opportunities”95, but it seems that economics, as is often the case, is the chief focus of this type 
of forestry management. Any provision of “social and cultural opportunities” has been at the 
hand of Mistik, not the Minister, Saskatchewan Environment or the Province of Saskatchewan.  
So, not only is the design of this management model flawed, the state actor is essentially absent. 
Its main concern seems to be maintenance of the Annual Allowable Cut and royalty income 
generation.   
6.4 Limits of the Study 
While I have been familiar with the Mistik case for over two years and have spent time in 
the MLTC communities in the past, I did not spend enough time there this year to fully explore 
these issues. Much of the information was gathered from a small number of key sources (the 
majority of which were males), so some of the nuances of the case may have been lost or 
misrepresented.  I am also an outsider to the communities so cannot pretend to have a thorough 
understanding of all the different communities issues and concerns.  This thesis is but a glimpse 
into the politics of this particular case.  More in-depth and widespread structured interviews 
would have to be conducted to get a complete picture of the partnership. 
6.5 Areas for Further Research 
It is important to note that there are currently no community-owned or cooperative 
ventures in the forestry industry in Saskatchewan. A number of questions flow from this 
realization. Is it because the capacity truly does not exist? How would this be assessed in the 
MLTC communities?  A number of community members reported the capacity does in fact exist 
                                                 
95 Government of Saskatchewan. Forest Resource Management Act. (Regina: Government of Saskatchewan, 1996) 
c.F-19.1, s.3. 
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and that they could practice less mechanized forestry to employ greater numbers of people and 
they could run their own mill.  Is it true that the capacity does exist but neither Mistik nor the 
provincial government wants to cede any more control over operations? 
While this thesis has provided some insight into the motivations of the partners involved 
in this case study, there remains much to be studied on the topic.  Among other things, it would 
be interesting to know how much influence Mistik’s Aboriginal employees have upon both the 
company’s management practices and how its senior leadership chooses and interacts with the 
different partners.  The role of ENGOs in PPPs with private actors is an interesting notion that 
requires further analysis. It would also be worthwhile to further explore this notion of corporate 
led governance; it has been discussed in regards to other sectors, but not significantly so within 
resource management.  More such case studies of private actors involved in partnerships with 
civil society would have to be examined in order to draw any meaningful conclusions. 
6.6 Conclusion 
 
Mistik’s relationship with the MLTC communities is commonly referred to as co-
management. This is the arrangement that was agreed to in the initial FMLA signed by MLTC, 
and it is the language employed in their agreements with the individual communities.  The use of 
this term is misleading.  The relationship that exists between the Province of Saskatchewan as 
regulator, MLTC as signing partner, Mistik as the body responsible for co-managing with the 
communities and the communities themselves is, at best, a public-private partnership that allows 
little room for meaningful public participation.  The term co-management is being used 
incorrectly and does not reflect the current reality. 
That being said, there are many instances where Mistik recognizes the limits of this 
partnership, including the language of their “co-management” agreements.  There is no mention 
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of governing or managing forests together with stakeholders or MLTC communities; they are 
rather, apparently, only committed to addressing the impacts their forestry operations have upon 
forest users’ values and the rights enjoyed by Indigenous or Aboriginal peoples.   
Mistik has not successfully engaged MLTC community members and their co-
management boards. This is however, only one of the problems that was to be addressed in this 
study; another was to identify those theories that apply to public-private partnerships.  This 
review demonstrates that theories of political economy and power directly apply, as do 
behavioural theories of social capital and collective action, if to a lesser degree.  While this is a 
significant contribution to the study of PPPs, it should be stated that this thesis is merely a 
glimpse into the theories behind and practice of partnerships. While it has added to the discourse, 
there remains much to be determined on the case itself, and perhaps more importantly, on its 
potential implications for the forestry industry, Aboriginal self-government, the future of ENGOs 
and the changing face of governance. 
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Appendix 1: 
Survey Questions 
 
 
Survey Questions for Community Advisory Board Members: 
 
1. How has Mistik used your input in their forestry management plan? 
2. Does the plan incorporate any traditional knowledge? If yes, how did Mistik access this 
knowledge? 
3. Did the $.50 stumpage fee paid to your board enhance your ability to get involved in the 
comanagement process? How? 
4. What does the term “comanagement” mean to you? What is the ideal form of 
comanagement for your community? How could this ideal be achieved, and who is 
responsible for making any necessary changes? 
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 Appendix 2: 
The Co-management Agreement 
 
The principles of the co-management agreement between Mistik and the MLTC communities are 
as follows: 
• 2.1 Mistik has a valid FMA which has been granted to it by the Province and 
which allows Mistik to harvest trees and manage the forest within the license 
area in accordance with principles of integrated resource management. 
• 2.2 The people who reside within the forest area have a right to be consulted with 
respect to the manner in which their values are impacted by Mistik’s forest 
management activities and to require reasonable accommodation and protection of 
such values with respect to forestry impacts; 
• 2.3 On behalf of the people of Saskatchewan the Province owns the forest and 
resources located on Crown lands and has the responsibility to review and approve all forest 
harvesting and management plans developed under the FMA. 
• 2.4 Mistik has a responsibility to address the impact of its forest operations on the 
existing rights enjoyed by indigenous or aboriginal peoples and which arise by law or from 
any Treaty or Aboriginal right guaranteed by section 35 of the Constitution Act of Canada, 
including the right to fish, hunt, trap and gather.96 
                                                 
96 Mistik Management Ltd. Forestry Co-management Agreement. (Meadow Lake: Mistik Management Ltd., 2007) 
Available online at: http://www.mistik.ca/public_involvement.htm  
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 Appendix 3:  
Forest Stewardship Council & Indigenous Peoples’ Rights 
 
The legal and customary rights of indigenous peoples to own, use and manage their lands, 
territories, and resources shall be recognized and respected. 
 
3.1 Indigenous peoples shall control forest management on their lands and territories 
unless they delegate control with free and informed consent to other agencies. 
3.2 Forest management shall not threaten or diminish, either directly or indirectly, the 
resources or tenure rights of indigenous peoples. 
3.3 Sites of special cultural, ecological, economic or religious significance to indigenous 
peoples shall be clearly identified in cooperation with such peoples, and recognized and 
protected by forest managers. 
3.4 Indigenous peoples shall be compensated for the application of their traditional 
knowledge regarding the use of forest species or management systems in forest 
operations. This compensation shall be formally agreed upon with their free and informed 
consent before forest operations commence.97 
                                                 
97 Forest Stewardship Council. Principle 3: Principles and Criteria for Forest Stewardship. (Bonn: Forest 
Stewardship Council, 2000) Found online 20/11/07: http://www.fsccanada.org/generalresources.htm  
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